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2Abstract
Economies are complicated systems encompassing micro behaviors, interaction patterns, and
global regularities. Whether partial or general in scope, studies of economic systems must
consider how to handle diﬃcult real-world aspects such as asymmetric information, imperfect
competition, strategic interaction, collective learning, and the possibility of multiple equilib-
ria. Recent advances in analytical and computational tools are permitting new approaches
to the quantitative study of these aspects. One such approach is Agent-based Computational
Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic sys-
tems of interacting agents. This chapter explores the potential advantages and disadvantages
of ACE for the study of economic systems. General points are concretely illustrated using an
ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Six issues are highlighted: Con-
structive understanding of production, pricing, and trade processes; the essential primacy of
survival; strategic rivalry and market power; behavioral uncertainty and learning; the role
of conventions and organizations; and the complex interactions among structural attributes,
institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions.
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Economies are complex dynamic systems. Large numbers of micro agents engage repeatedly
in local interactions, giving rise to global regularities such as employment and growth rates,
income distributions, market institutions, and social conventions. These global regularities
in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. The result is an intricate
system of interdependent feedback loops connecting micro behaviors, interaction patterns,
and global regularities.
Economists have grappled with the modeling of economic systems for hundreds of years.
Nevertheless, the Walrasian equilibrium model devised by the nineteenth-century French
economist Leon Walras (1834-1910) still remains the fundamental paradigm that frames
the way many economists think about this issue. Competitive models directly adopt the
paradigm. Imperfectly competitive models typically adopt the paradigm as a benchmark
of coordination success. Although often critiqued for its excessive abstraction and lack of
empirical salience, the paradigm has persisted.
As detailed by Katzner (1989) and Takayama (1985), Walrasian equilibrium in modern-
day form is a precisely formulated set of conditions under which feasible allocations of goods
and services can be price-supported in an economic system organized on the basis of decen-
tralized markets with private ownership of productive resources. These conditions postulate
the existence of a ﬁnite number of price-taking proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms who produce goods
and services of known type and quality, a ﬁnite number of consumers with exogenously de-
termined preferences who maximize their utility of consumption taking prices and dividend
payments as given, and a Walrasian Auctioneer (or equivalent clearinghouse construct) that
determines prices to ensure each market clears.1 Assuming consumer nonsatiation, the First
Welfare Theorem guarantees that every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient.
The most salient structural characteristic of Walrasian equilibrium is its strong depen-
dence on the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism, a coordination device that eliminates
the possibility of strategic behavior. All agent interactions are passively mediated through
payment systems; face-to-face personal interactions are not permitted. Prices and dividend
payments constitute the only links among consumers and ﬁrms prior to actual trades. Since
consumers take prices and dividend payments as given aspects of their decision problems,
outside of their control, their decision problems reduce to simple optimization problems with
no perceived dependence on the actions of other agents. A similar observation holds for the
decision problems faced by the price-taking ﬁrms. The equilibrium values for the linking
price and dividend variables are determined by market clearing conditions imposed through
the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism; they are not determined by the actions of
consumers, ﬁrms, or any other agency supposed to actually reside within the economy.
1The colorful term “Walrasian Auctioneer” was ﬁrst introduced by Leijonhufvud (1967). He explains the
origins of the term as follows (personal correspondence, May 10, 2004): “I had come across this statement by
Norbert Weiner, made in the context of explaining Maxwell’s Demon to a lay audience, to the eﬀect that ‘in
the physics of our grandfathers’ information was costless. So I anthropomorphized the tˆ atonnement process
to get a Walras’s Demon to match Maxwell’s.”
4Walrasian equilibrium is an elegant aﬃrmative answer to a logically posed issue: can
eﬃcient allocations be supported through decentralized market prices? It does not address,
and was not meant to address, how production, pricing, and trade actually take place in
real-world economies through various forms of procurement processes.
What, speciﬁcally, is standardly meant by “procurement processes” in the business world?
As discussed at length by Mackie-Mason and Wellman (2006), customers and suppliers must
identify what goods and services they wish to buy and sell, in what volume, and at what
prices. Potential trade partners must be identiﬁed, oﬀers to buy and sell must be prepared
and transmitted, and receivedoﬀers must be compared and evaluated. Speciﬁc trade partners
must be selected, possibly with further negotiation to determine contract provisions, and
transactions and payment processing must be carried out. Finally, customer and supplier
relationships involving longer-term commitments must be managed.
Theories always simplify, and substituting equilibrium assumptions for procurement pro-
cesses is one way to achieve an immensely simpliﬁed representation of an economic system.
For economic systems known to have a globally stable equilibrium, this simpliﬁcation might
be considered reasonable since procurement processes do not aﬀect the system’s long-run
behavior. Even in this case, however, the path of adjustment could be of considerable prac-
tical concern as a determinant of the speed of convergence. For economic systems without
a globally stable equilibrium, procurement processes determine how the dynamics of the
system play out over time from any initial starting point.
As carefully detailed by Fisher (1983) and Takayama (1985,Chapters 2-3), economists
have not been able to ﬁnd empirically compelling suﬃcient conditions guaranteeing exis-
tence of Walrasian equilibria, let alone uniqueness, stability, and rapid speed of convergence,
even for relatively simple modelings of market economies. For extensions of the Walrasian
framework to dynamic open-ended economies, such as overlapping generations economies,
multiple equilibria commonly occur and the Pareto eﬃciency of these equilibria is no longer
guaranteed.2 The explicit consideration of procurement processes would therefore appear to
be critically important for understanding how numerous market economies have managed in
practice to exhibit reasonably coordinated behavior over time. As eloquently expressed by
Fisher (1983, p. 16):
“The theory of value is not satisfactory without a description of the adjust-
ment processes that are applicable to the economy and of the way in which
individual agents adjust to disequilibrium. In this sense, stability analysis is of
far more than merely technical interest. It is the ﬁrst step in the reformulation
of the theory of value.”
A natural way to proceed is to examine what happens in a standard Walrasian model if
the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism is removed and if prices and quantities are in-
2See, for example, Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991,1998a,b). Interestingly, the latter studies illustrate how
more explicit attention to procurement processes can produce more optimistic assessments of market per-
formance. The studies show that the First Welfare Theorem can be restored for overlapping generations
economies if the passive Walrasian Auctioneer intent only on market clearing is replaced by active private
corporate intermediaries intent on the maximization of their shareholders’ proﬁts.
5stead required to be set entirely through the procurement actions of the ﬁrms and consumers
themselves. Not surprisingly, this “small” perturbation of the Walrasian model turns out to
be anything but small. Even a minimalist attempt to complete the resulting model leads
to analytical diﬃculty or even intractability. As elaborated by numerous commentators,
the modeler must now come to grips with challenging issues such as asymmetric informa-
tion, strategic interaction, expectation formation on the basis of limited information, mutual
learning, social norms, transaction costs, externalities, market power, predation, collusion,
and the possibility of coordination failure (convergence to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium).3
The prevalence of market protocols, rationing rules, antitrust legislation, and other types of
institutions in real-world economies is now better understood as a potentially critical aspect
of procurement, the scaﬀolding needed to ensure orderly economic process.
Over time, increasingly sophisticated tools are permitting economic modelers to incor-
porate procurement processes in increasingly compelling ways. Some of these tools involve
advances in logical deduction and some involve advances in computational power.4
This chapter provides an introductory discussion of a potentially fruitful computational
development, Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Exploiting the growing capa-
bilities of computers, ACE is the computational study of economic processes modeled as
dynamic systems of interacting agents.5 Here “agent” refers broadly to bundled data and be-
havioral methods representing an entity constituting part of a computationally constructed
world. Examples of possible agents include individuals (e.g., consumers, workers), social
groupings (e.g., families, ﬁrms, government agencies), institutions (e.g., markets, regula-
tory systems), biological entities (e.g., crops, livestock, forests), and physical entities (e.g.,
infrastructure, weather, and geographical regions). Thus, agents can range from active data-
gathering decision-makers with sophisticated learning capabilities to passive world features
with no cognitive functioning. Moreover, agents can be composed of other agents, thus per-
mitting hierarchical constructions. For example, a ﬁrm might be composed of workers and
managers.6
3See, for example, Akerlof (2002), Albin and Foley (1992), Arrow (1987), Bowles and Gintis (2000),
Colander (1996), Feiwel (1985), Hoover (1992), Howitt (1990), Kirman (1997), Klemperer (2002a,b), and
Leijonhufvud (1996).
4See, for example, Albin (1998), Anderson et al. (1988), Arthur et al. (1997), Axelrod (1997), Brock et
al. (1991), Clark (1997), Day and Chen (1993), Durlauf and Young (2001), Gigerenzer and Selten (2001),
Gintis (2000), Judd (1998), Krugman (1996), Nelson (1995), Nelson and Winter (1982), Prescott (1996),
Roth (2002), Sargent (1993), Schelling (1978), Shubik (1991), Simon (1982), Witt (1993), and Young (1998).
5See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for extensive on-line resources related to ACE, in-
cluding readings, course materials, software, toolkits, demos, and pointers to individual researchers and
research groups. A diverse sampling of ACE research can be found in Leombruni and Richiardi (2004) and
in Tesfatsion (2001a,b,c). For surveys and other introductory materials, see Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006),
Batten (2000), Epstein and Axtell (1996), Tesfatsion (2002), and the remaining entries of this handbook.
6A person familiar with object-oriented programming (OOP) might wonder why “agent” is used here
instead of “object,” or “object template” (class), since both agents and objects refer to computational
entities that package together data and functionality and support inheritance and composition. Following
Jennings (2000) and other agent-oriented programmers, “agent” is used to stress the intended application to
problem domains that include entities capable of varying degrees of self-governance and self-directed social
6Section 2 explains more fully the basic ACE methodology and discusses the potential
advantages and disadvantages of ACE for the study of economic systems. An illustrative
ACE model of a relatively simple two-sector decentralized market economy, referred to as
the “ACE Trading World,” is outlined in Section 3. This model is used in Section 4 to
discuss in concrete terms several important but diﬃcult issues associated with procurement
processes in real-world economies that ACE is able to address. Concluding remarks are given
in Section 5. A detailed discussion of the ACE Trading World is presented in an Appendix.
2 ACE study of economic systems
A system is typically deﬁned to be complex if it exhibits the following two properties [see,
e.g., Flake (1998)]:
• The system is composed of interacting units;
• The system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interac-
tions of the units that are not properties of the individual units themselves.
Agreement on the deﬁnition of a complex adaptive system has proved to be more diﬃcult
to achieve. The range of possible deﬁnitions oﬀered by commentators includes the following
three nested characterizations:
Deﬁnition 1: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes reactive units,
i.e.,units capable of exhibiting systematicallydiﬀerent attributes in reaction to changed
environmental conditions.7
Deﬁnition 2: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes goal-directed
units, i.e., units that are reactive and that direct at least some of their reactions towards
the achievement of built-in (or evolved) goals.
Deﬁnition 3: A complex adaptive system is a complex system that includes planner units,
i.e., units that are goal-directed and that attempt to exert some degree of control over
their environment to facilitate achievement of these goals.
interactions. In contrast, OOP has traditionally interpreted objects as passive tools in the service of some
speciﬁc task. Consider, for example, the following description from the well-known Java text by Eckel (2003,
p. 37): “One of the best ways to think about objects is as ‘service providers.’ Your goal is to produce...a set
of objects that provides the ideal services to solve your problem.”
7For example, this deﬁnition includes simple Darwinian systems for which each unit has a rigidly struc-
tured behavioral rule as well as a “ﬁtness” attribute measuring the performance of this unit relative to the
average performance of other units in the current unit population. A unit ceases to function if it has suﬃ-
ciently low ﬁtness; otherwise it reproduces (makes copies of itself) in proportion to its ﬁtness. If the initial
unit population exhibits diverse behaviors across units, then the ﬁtness attribute of each unit will change
systematically in response to changes in the composition of the unit population.
7The ACE methodology is a culture-dish approach to the study of economic systems
viewed as complex adaptive systems in the sense of Deﬁnition 1, at a minimum, and often in
the stronger sense of Deﬁnition 2 or Deﬁnition 3. As in a culture-dish laboratory experiment,
the ACE modeler starts by computationally constructing an economic world comprising
multiple interacting agents (units). The modeler then steps back to observe the development
of the world over time.
The agents in an ACE model can include economic entities as well as social, biological,
and physical entities (e.g., families, crops, and weather). Each agent is an encapsulated
piece of software that includes data together with behavioral methods that act on these
data. Some of these data and methods are designated as publicly accessible to all other
agents, some are designated as private and hence not accessible by any other agents, and
some are designated as protected from access by all but a speciﬁed subset of other agents.
Agents can communicate with each other through their public and protected methods.
The ACE modeler speciﬁes the initial state of an economic system by specifying each
agent’s initial data and behavioral methods and the degree of accessibility of these data and
methods to other agents. As illustrated in Tables 1 through 4, an agent’s data might in-
clude its type attribute (e.g., world, market, ﬁrm, consumer), its structural attributes (e.g.,
geography, design, cost function, utility function), and information about the attributes of
other agents (e.g., addresses). An agent’s methods can include socially instituted behav-
ioral methods (e.g., antitrust laws, market protocols) as well as private behavioral methods.
Examples of the latter include production and pricing strategies, learning algorithms for up-
dating strategies, and methods for changing methods (e.g., methods for switching from one
learning algorithm to another). The resulting ACE model must be dynamically complete.
As illustrated in Table 5, this means the modeled economic system must be able to develop
over time solely on the basis of agent interactions, without further interventions from the
modeler.
[[ INSERT TABLES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 ABOUT HERE ]]
In the real world, all calculations have real cost consequences because they must be car-
ried out by some agency actually residing in the world. ACE modeling forces the modeler to
respect this constraint. An ACE model is essentially a collection of algorithms (procedures)
that have been encapsulated into the methods of software entities called “agents.” Algo-
rithms encapsulated into the methods of a particular agent can only be implemented using
the particular information, reasoning tools, time, and physical resources available to that
agent. This encapsulation into agents is done in an attempt to achieve a more transparent
and realistic representation of real-world systems involving multiple distributed entities with
limited information and computational capabilities.
Current ACE research divides roughly into four strands diﬀerentiated by objective.8 One
primary objective is empirical understanding: why have particular global regularities evolved
and persisted, despite the absence of centralized planning and control? ACE researchers
8See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aapplic.htm for pointers to resource sites for a variety of ACE
research areas.
8pursuing this objective seek causal explanations grounded in the repeated interactions of
agents operating in realistically rendered worlds. Ideally, the agents should have the same
ﬂexibility of action in their worlds as their corresponding entities have in the real world.
In particular, the cognitive agents should be free to behave in accordance with their own
beliefs, preferences, institutions, and physical circumstances without the external imposition
of equilibrium conditions. The key issue is whether particular types of observed global
regularities can be reliably generated from particular types of agent-based worlds, what
Epstein and Axtell (1996) refer to as the “generative” approach to science.9
A second primary objective is normative understanding: how can agent-based models be
used as laboratories for the discovery of good economic designs? ACE researchers pursuing
this objective are interested in evaluating whether designs proposed for economic policies,
institutions, and processes will result in socially desirable system performance over time.
The general approach is akin to ﬁlling a bucket with water to determine if it leaks. An
agent-based world is constructed that captures the salient aspects of an economic system
operating under the design. The world is then populated with privately motivated agents
with learning capabilities and allowed to develop over time. The key issue is the extent to
which the resulting world outcomes are eﬃcient, fair, and orderly, despite attempts by agents
to gain individual advantage through strategic behavior.10
A third primary objective is qualitative insight and theory generation: how can economic
systems be more fully understood through a systematic examination of their potential dy-
namical behaviors under alternatively speciﬁed initial conditions?11 Such understanding
would help to clarify not only why certain global outcomes have regularly been observed
but also why others have not. A quintessential example is the old but still unresolved con-
cern of economists such as Smith (1937), Schumpeter (1934), and Hayek (1948): what are
the self-organizing capabilities of decentralized market economies? For the latter issue, the
typical approach is to construct an agent-based world that captures key aspects of decen-
tralized market economies (circular ﬂow, limited information, strategic pricing,...), introduce
privately motivated traders with learning capabilities, and let the world develop over time.
The key concern is the extent to which coordination of trade activities emerges and persists
as the traders collectively learn how to make their production and pricing decisions.12
A fourth primary objective is methodological advancement: how best to provide ACE re-
searchers with the methods and tools they need to undertake the rigorous study of economic
9This issue is considered in the handbook contributions by Brenner (2006), Dawid (2006), Duﬀy (2006),
Epstein (2006), Hommes (2006), Howitt (2006), LeBaron (2006), and Leijonhufvud (2006).
10See, for example, the handbook contributions by Janssen and Ostrom (2006), MacKie-Mason and Well-
man (2006), and Marks (2006).
11This question is addressed in this handbook by Arthur (2006), Axelrod (2006), Chang and Harring-
ton (2006), Kollman and Page (2006), Schelling (2006), Vriend (2006), Wilhite (2006), and Young (2006).
12An illustrative ACE study of this issue is provided in Section 3, below. Pointers to additional ACE work
on this issue can be found at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/amulmark.htm. There is also an active
literature on macroeconomic models with learning (forecasting) agents that maintains price-taking assump-
tions for ﬁrms and consumers and hence rules out any direct strategic interaction eﬀects. See Arifovic (2000)
and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for surveys of some of this work.
9systems through controlled computational experiments? To produce compelling analyses,
ACE researchers need to model the salient structural, institutional, and behavioral charac-
teristics of economic systems. They need to formulate interesting theoretical propositions
about their models, evaluate the logical validity of these propositions by means of carefully
crafted experimental designs, and condense and report information from their experiments
in a clear and compelling manner. Finally, they need to test their experimentally-generated
theories against real-world data. ACE researchers are exploring a variety of ways to meet
these requirements ranging from careful consideration of methodological principles to the
practical development of programming, visualization, and validation tools.13
ACE can be applied to a broad spectrum of economic systems ranging from micro to
macro in scope. This application has both advantages and disadvantages relative to more
standard modeling approaches.
On the plus side, as in industrial organization theory [Tirole (2003)], agents in ACE
models can be represented as interactive goal-directed entities, strategically aware of both
competitive and cooperative possibilities with other agents. As in the extensive-form market
game work of researchers such as Albin and Foley (1992), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990),
and Shubik (1991, Chapter 15), market protocols and other institutions constraining agent
interactions can constitute important explicit aspects of the modeled economic processes.
As in the behavioral game theory work of researchers such as Camerer (2003), agents can
learn, i.e., change their behavior based on previous experience; and this learning can be
calibrated to what actual people are observed to do in real-world or controlled laboratory
settings. Moreover, as in work by Gintis (2000) that blends aspects of evolutionary game
theory with cultural evolution, the beliefs, preferences, behaviors, and interaction patterns
of the agents can vary endogenously over time.
One key departure of ACE modeling from more standard approaches is that events are
driven solely by agent interactions once initial conditions have been speciﬁed. Thus, rather
than focusing on the equilibrium states of a system, the idea is to watch and see if some
form of equilibrium develops over time. The objective is to acquire a better understanding
of a system’s entire phase portrait, i.e., all possible equilibria together with corresponding
basins of attraction. An advantage of this focus on process rather than on equilibrium is
that modeling can proceed even if equilibria are computationally intractable or non-existent.
A second key departure presenting a potential advantage is the increased facility provided
by agent-based tools for agents to engage in ﬂexible social communication. This means that
agents can communicate with other agents at event-driven times using messages that they,
themselves, have adaptively scripted.
However, it is frequently claimed that the most important advantage of ACE modeling
relative to more standard modeling approaches is that agent-based tools facilitate the design
of agents with relatively more autonomy; see Jennings (2000). Autonomy, for humans, means
13ACE methodologicalissues are addressed by manyof the authors in this handbook. See, in particular, the
contributions by Arthur (2006), Axelrod (2006), Brenner (2006), Dibble (2006), Duﬀy (2006), Epstein (2006),
Howitt (2006), Judd (2006), Leijonhufvud (2006), and Schelling (2006).
10a capacity for self-governance.14 What does it mean for computational agents?
Here is how an “autonomous agent” is deﬁned by a leading expert in artiﬁcial intelligence,
Stan Franklin (1997a):
“An autonomous agent is a system situated within and part of an environment
that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own
agenda and so as to eﬀect what it senses in the future.”
Clearly the standard neoclassical budget-constrained consumer who selects a sequence of
purchases to maximize her expected lifetime utility could be said to satisfy this deﬁnition
in some sense. Consequently, the important issue is not whether agent-based tools permit
the modeling of agents with autonomy, per se, but rather the degree to which they usefully
facilitate the modeling of agents exhibiting substantially more autonomy than permitted by
standard modeling approaches.
What degree of agent autonomy, then, do agent-based tools permit? In any purely math-
ematical model, including any ACE model in which agents do not have access to “true”
random numbers,15 the actions of an agent are ultimately determined by the conditions of
the agent’s world at the time of the agent’s conception. A fundamental issue, dubbed the
First AI Debate by Franklin (1997b, Chapter 5), is whether or not the same holds true for
humans. In particular, is Penrose (1989) correct when he eloquently argues there is some-
thing fundamentally non-computational about human thought, something that intrinsically
prevents the algorithmic representation of human cognitive and social behaviors?
Lacking a deﬁnitive answer to this question, ACE researchers argue more pragmatically
that agent-based tools facilitate the modeling of cognitive agents with more realistic social
and learning capabilities (hence more autonomy) than one ﬁnds in traditional Homo eco-
nomicus. As suggested in Tables 3 and 4, these capabilities include: social communication
skills; the ability to learn about one’s environment from various sources, such as gathered in-
formation, past experiences, social mimicry, and deliberate experimentation with new ideas;
the ability to form and maintain social interaction patterns (e.g., trade networks); the abil-
ity to develop shared perceptions (e.g., commonly accepted market protocols); the ability to
alter beliefs and preferences as an outcome of learning; and the ability to exert at least some
local control over the timing and type of actions taken within the world in an attempt to
satisfy built in (or evolved) needs, drives, and goals. A potentially important aspect of all of
these modeled capabilities is that they can be based in part on the private internal methods
of an agent, i.e., internal processes that are hidden from the view of all other entities residing
in the agent’s world. This eﬀectively renders an agent both unpredictable and uncontrollable
relative to its world.
In addition, as indicated in Tables 3 and 4, an agent can introduce structural changes
in its methods over time on the basis of experience. For example, it can have a method for
14See the “Personal Autonomy” entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site, accessible at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/.
15Agent-based modelers can now replace deterministically generated pseudo-random numbers with ran-
dom numbers generated by real-world processes such as atmospheric noise and radioactive decay; see, e.g.,
http://www.random.org. This development has potentially interesting philosophical ramiﬁcations.
11systematically introducing structural changes in its current learning method so that it learns
to learn over time. Thus, agents can socially construct distinct persistent personalities.
Agent-based tools also facilitate the modeling of social and biological aspects of economic
systems thought to be important for autonomous behavior that go beyond the aspects re-
ﬂected in Tables 1 through 5. For example, agents can be represented as embodied (e.g.,
sighted) entities with the ability to move from place to place in general spatial landscapes.
Agents can also be endowed with “genomes” permitting the study of economic systems with
genetically-based reproduction and with evolution of biological populations. For extensive
discussion and illustration of agent-based models incorporating such features, see Belew and
Mitchell (1996), Epstein and Axtell (1996), and Holland (1995).
What are the disadvantages of ACE relative to more standard modeling approaches? One
drawback is that ACE modeling requires the construction of dynamically complete economic
models. That is, starting from initial conditions, the model must permit and fully support
the playing out of agent interactions over time without further intervention from the mod-
eler. This completeness requires detailed initial speciﬁcations for agent data and methods
determining structural attributes, institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions.
If agent interactions induce suﬃciently strong positive feedbacks, small changes in these
initial speciﬁcations could radically aﬀect the types of outcomes that result. Consequently,
intensive experimentation must often be conducted over a wide array of plausible initial
speciﬁcations for ACE models if robust prediction is to be achieved.16 Moreover, it is not
clear how well ACE models will be able to scale up to provide empirically and practically
useful models of large-scale systems with many thousands of agents.
Another drawback is the diﬃculty of validating ACE model outcomes against empirical
data. ACE experiments generate outcome distributions for theoretical economic systems
with explicitlyarticulated microfoundations. Often these outcome distributions have a multi-
peaked form suggesting multiple equilibria rather than a central-tendency form permitting
simple point predictions. In contrast, the real world is a single time-series realization arising
from a poorly understood data generating process. Even if an ACE model were to accurately
embody this real-world data generating process, it might be impossible to verify this accuracy
using standard statistical procedures. For example, an empirically observed outcome might
be a low-probability event lying in a relatively small peak of the outcome distribution for
this true data-generating process, or in a thin tail of this distribution.
3 From Walrasian equilibrium to ACE trading
For concrete illustration, this section ﬁrst presents in summary form a Walrasian equilibrium
modeling of a simple two-sector economy with price-taking ﬁrms and consumers. The Wal-
rasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism is then removed, resulting in a dynamically incomplete
economy. Speciﬁcally, the resulting economy has no processes for determining how produc-
tion and price levels are set, how buyers are to be matched with sellers, and how goods are
16This point is discussed at some length by Judd (2006).
12to be distributed from sellers to buyers in cases in which matching fails to result in market
clearing.
One possible way to complete the economy with agent-driven procurement processes
is then outlined, resulting in an ACE Trading World. The completion is minimal in the
sense that only procurement processes essential for re-establishing the underlying circular
ﬂow between ﬁrms and consumers are considered. As will be elaborated more carefully
below, these processes include ﬁrm learning methods for production and pricing, ﬁrm proﬁt
allocation methods, ﬁrm rationing methods, and consumer price discovery methods.
In the ACE Trading World, ﬁrms that fail to cover their costs risk insolvency and con-
sumers who fail to provide for their subsistence needs face death. Consequently, the adequacy
of the procurement processes used by these ﬁrms and consumers determines whether they
survive and even prosper over time. The critical role played by procurement processes in the
ACE Trading World highlights in concrete terms the extraordinarily powerful role played by
the Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism in standard Walrasian equilibrium models.
3.1 Walrasian bliss in a hash-and-beans economy
Consider the following Walrasian equilibrium modeling of a simple one-period economy with
two production sectors. The economy is populated by a ﬁnite number of proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms
producing hash, a ﬁnite number of proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms producing beans, and a ﬁnite number
of consumers who derive utility from the consumption of hash and beans. Each ﬁrm has a
total cost function expressing its production costs as a function of its output level. Each
consumer is endowed with an equal ownership share in each ﬁrm as well as an exogenous
money income.
At the beginning of the period, each ﬁrm has expectations for the price of hash and the
price of beans. Conditional on these price expectations, the ﬁrm selects a production level
to maximize its proﬁts. The solution to this proﬁt-maximizing problem gives the optimal
output supply for the ﬁrm as a function of its price expectations and its cost function. At
the end of the period, all ﬁrm proﬁts are distributed back to consumers as dividends in
proportion to their ownership shares.
At the beginning of the period, each consumer has expectations regarding the dividends
she will receive back from each ﬁrm, as well as expectations for the price of hash and the
price of beans. Conditional on these expectations, the consumer chooses hash and bean
demands to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint. This budget constraint
takes the following form: the expected value of planned expenditures must be less than or
equal to expected total income. The solution to this utility maximization problem gives the
optimal hash and bean demands for the consumer as a function of her dividend expectations,
her price expectations, her tastes (utility function), and her exogenous money income.
Deﬁnition: A speciﬁc vector e∗ comprising each consumer’s demands for hash and beans,
each ﬁrm’s supply of hash or beans, nonnegative prices for hash and beans, expected prices
for hash and beans, and consumer expected dividends, is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium
if the following four conditions hold:
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consumer expected prices and consumer expected dividends, and all ﬁrm supplies are
optimal supplies conditional on ﬁrm expected prices.
(b) Correct Expectations: At e∗, all expected prices coincide with actual prices, and all ex-
pected dividends coincide with actual dividends calculated as consumer shares of actual
ﬁrm proﬁts.
(c) Market Clearing: At e∗, aggregate supply is greater than or equal to aggregate demand
in both the market for hash and the market for beans.
(d) Walras’ Law (Strong Form): At e∗, the total value of excess supply is zero; i.e., the total
value of all demands for hash and beans equals the total value of all supplies of hash
and beans.
Conditions (c) and (d) together imply that any consumption good in excess supply at
e∗ must have a zero price. If consumers are nonsatiated at e∗, meaning they would demand
more of at least one type of good if their incomes were to increase, their budget constraints
must be binding on their purchases at e∗. Given nonsatiation together with conditions
(a) and (b), a summation of all consumer budget constraints would then reveal that the
total value of excess supply must necessarily be exactly zero at e∗, i.e., Walras’ Law in the
strong sense of condition (d) necessarily holds. Finally, given consumer nonsatiation together
with conditions (a) through (c), the First Welfare Theorem ensures that any hash and bean
consumption levels supportable as optimal consumer demands under a Walrasian equilibrium
will be a Pareto eﬃcient consumption allocation [see Takayama (1985,Thm.2.C.1,p.192)].
3.2 Plucking out the Walrasian Auctioneer
The fulﬁllment of conditions (b) through (d) in the above deﬁnition of Walrasian equilibrium
eﬀectively deﬁnes the task assigned to the Walrasian Auctioneer. This task has three distinct
aspects, assumed costless to achieve. First, all prices must be set at market clearing levels
conditional on ﬁrm and consumer expectations. Second, all ﬁrms must have correct price
expectations and all consumers must have correct price and dividend expectations. Third,
consumers must be appropriately matched with ﬁrms to ensure an eﬃcient set of trades.
To move from Walrasian to agent-based modeling, the Walrasian Auctioneer has to be
replaced by agent-driven procurement processes. As discussed at some length in Section 1,
this replacement is by no means a small perturbation of the model. Without the Walrasian
Auctioneer, the following types of agent-enacted methods are minimally required in order to
maintain a circular ﬂow between ﬁrms and consumers over time:
Terms of Trade: Firms must determine how their price and production levels will be set.
Seller-Buyer Matching: Firms and consumers must engage in a matching process that puts
potential sellers in contact with potential buyers.
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or supplies arising from the matching process.
Trade: Firms and consumers must carry out actual trades.
Settlement: Firms and consumers must settle their payment obligations.
Shake-Out: Firms that become insolvent and consumers who fail to satisfy their subsistence
consumption needs must exit the economy.
Attention thus shifts from ﬁrms and consumers optimizing in isolation, conditional on ex-
pected prices and dividends, to the interaction patterns occurring among ﬁrms and consumers
as they attempt to carry out their trading activities.
The ACE Trading World, outlined below and detailed in the Appendix, illustrates one
possible completion of the hash-and-beans economy with procurement handled by the agents
themselves rather than by a Walrasian Auctioneer. The resulting process model is described
at each point in time by the conﬁguration of data and methods across all agents. A partial
listing of these data and methods is schematically indicated in Tables 1 through 4. As
indicated in Table 5, all outcomes in the ACE Trading World are generated through ﬁrm
and consumer interactions played out within the constraints imposed by currently prevalent
structural conditions and institutional arrangements; market clearing conditions are not
imposed. Consequently, in order to survive and even prosper in their world, the ﬁrms and
consumers must learn to coordinate their behaviors over time in an appropriate manner.
3.3 The ACE Trading World: Outline
Consider an economy that runs during periods T =0 ,1,...,TMax. At the beginning of
the initial period T = 0 the economy is populated by a ﬁnite number of proﬁt-seeking hash
ﬁrms, a ﬁnite number of proﬁt-seeking bean ﬁrms, and a ﬁnite number of consumers who
derive utility from the consumption of hash and beans.
Each ﬁrm in period T = 0 starts with a nonnegative amount of money and a positive
production capacity (size). Each ﬁrm has a total cost function that includes amortized ﬁxed
costs proportional to its current capacity. Each ﬁrm knows the number of hash ﬁrms, bean
ﬁrms, and consumers currently in the economy, and each ﬁrm knows that hash and beans
are perishable goods that last at most one period. However, no ﬁrm has prior knowledge
regarding the income levels and utility functions of the consumers or the cost functions and
capacities of other ﬁrms. Explicit collusion among ﬁrms is prohibited by antitrust laws.
Each consumer in period T = 0 has a lifetime money endowment proﬁle and a utility
function measuring preferences and subsistence needs for hash and beans consumption in
each period. Each consumer is also a shareholder who owns an equal fraction of each hash
and bean ﬁrm. The income of each consumer at the beginning of period T = 0 is entirely
determined by her money endowment. At the beginning of each subsequent period, each
consumer’s income is determined in part by her money endowment, in part by her savings
from previous periods, and in part by her newly received dividend payments from ﬁrms.
15At the beginning of each period T ≥ 0, each ﬁrm selects a supply oﬀer consisting of a
production level and a unit price. Each ﬁrm uses a learning method to make this selection,
conditional on its proﬁt history and its cost attributes. The basic question posed is as follows:
Given I have earned particular proﬁts in past periods using particular selected supply oﬀers,
how should this aﬀect my selection of a supply oﬀer in the current period? Each ﬁrm
immediately posts its selected supply oﬀer in an attempt to attract consumers. This posting
is carried out simultaneously by all ﬁrms, so that no ﬁrm has a strategic advantage through
asymmetric information.
At the beginning of each period T ≥ 0, each consumer costlessly acquires complete
information about the ﬁrms’ supply oﬀers as soon as they are posted. Consumers then
attempt to ensure their survival and happiness by engaging in a price discovery process
consisting of successive rounds. During each round, the following sequence of activities is
carried out. First, any consumer unable to cover her currently unmet subsistence needs at the
currently lowest posted prices immediately exits the price discovery process. Each remaining
consumer determines her utility-maximizing demands for hash and beans conditional on
her currently unspent income, her currently unmet subsistence needs, and the currently
lowest posted hash and bean prices. She then submits her demands to the ﬁrms that have
posted these lowest prices. Next, the ﬁrms receiving these demands attempt to satisfy them,
applying if necessary a rationing method. Consumers rationed below subsistence need for
one of the goods can adjust downward their demand for the remaining good to preserve
income for future rounds. Finally, actual trades take place, which concludes the round. Any
ﬁrms with unsold goods and any rationed consumers with unspent income then proceed into
the next round, and the process repeats.
This period-T price-discovery process comes to a halt either when all ﬁrms are stocked
out or when the unspent income levels of all consumers still participating in the process
have been reduced to zero. Consumers who exit or ﬁnish this process with positive unmet
subsistence needs die at the end of period T. Their unspent money holdings (if any) are
then lost to the economy, but their stock shares are distributed equally among all remaining
(alive) consumers at the beginning of period T + 1. This stock share redistribution method
ensures that each alive consumer continues to own an equal share of each ﬁrm. At the
end of each period T ≥ 0, each ﬁrm calculates its period-T proﬁts. A ﬁrm incurs positive
(negative) proﬁts if it sells (does not sell) enough output at a suﬃciently high price to cover
its total costs, including its ﬁxed costs. Each ﬁrm then calculates its period-T net worth
(total assets minus total liabilities). If a ﬁrm ﬁnds it does not have a positive17 net worth,
it is declared eﬀectively insolvent and it must exit the economy. Otherwise, the ﬁrm applies
a state-conditioned proﬁt allocation method to determine how its period-T proﬁts (positive
or negative) should be allocated between money (dis)savings, capacity (dis)investment, and
(nonnegative) dividend payments to its shareholders.
In summary, the ACE Trading World incorporates several key structural attributes, in-
stitutional arrangements, and behavioral methods whose speciﬁcation could critically aﬀect
17As detailed in the Appendix, a valuation of each ﬁrm’s capacity is included in the calculation of its net
worth. Consequently, a zero net worth implies a ﬁrm has no capacity for production.
16model outcomes. These include: initial numbers and capacities of hash and bean ﬁrms; ini-
tial number of consumers; initial ﬁrm money holdings; consumer money endowment proﬁles;
initial ﬁrm cost functions; consumer utility functions; market price discovery and trading
protocols; world protocols regarding stock ownership, ﬁrm collusion, and ﬁrm insolvency;
ﬁrm learning methods; ﬁrm rationing methods; and ﬁrm proﬁt allocation methods.
The degree to which the ACE Trading World is capable of self-coordination can be
experimentally examined by studying the impact of changes in these speciﬁcations on micro
behaviors, interaction patterns, and global regularities. For example, as detailed in Cook
and Tesfatsion (2006), the ACE Trading World is being implemented as a computational
laboratory with a graphical user interface. This implementation will permit users to explore
systematically the eﬀects of alternative speciﬁcations, and to visualize these eﬀects through
various types of run-time displays.
3.4 Deﬁning “equilibrium” for the ACE Trading World
Deﬁnitions of equilibrium appearing in scientiﬁc discourse diﬀer in particulars depending on
the system under study. All such deﬁnitions, however, would appear to embody the following
core idea: a system is in equilibrium if all inﬂuences acting on the system oﬀset each other
so that the system is in an unchanging condition.
It is important to note the absence in this core deﬁnition of any conception of uniqueness,
optimality, or stability (robustness) with regard to external system disturbances. Once the
existence of an equilibrium has been established, one can further explore the particular
nature of this equilibrium. Is it unique? Does it exhibit optimality properties in any sense?
Is it locally stable with respect to displacements conﬁned to some neighborhood of the
equilibrium? If so, what can be said about the size and shape of this “basin of attraction”?
The ACE Trading World is a deterministic system.18 The state of the system at the
beginning of each period T is given by the methods and data of all of the agents currently
constituting the system. The methods include all of the processes used by agents in period T
to carry out production, pricing, and trade activities, both private behavioral methods and
public protocols. These methods are schematically indicated in Table 1 through Table 4 and
discussed in detail in Sections A.1 through A.7 of the Appendix. The data include all of the
exogenous and period-T predetermined variables for the ACE Trading World; a complete
listing of these variables can be found in Section A.8 of the Appendix.
Let X(T) denote the state of the ACE Trading World at the beginning of period T.B y
construction, the motion of this state follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process. That is, X(T +1)
is determined as a function of the previous state X(T). This function would be extremely
diﬃcult to represent in explicit structural form, but it could be done.19 For expository
18Each ﬁrm and consumer in the ACE Trading World implementation by Cook and Tesfatsion (2006)
has access to its own method for generating “random numbers.” However, as usual, these methods are in
actuality pseudo-random number generators consisting of systems of deterministic diﬀerence equations.
19See Epstein (2006) for a discussion of the recursive function representation of ACE models.
17purposes, let this state process be depicted as
X(T +1 ) = S (X(T)) ,T=0 , 1,. . . ,TMax. (1)
If in some period ¯ T ≥ 0 all ﬁrms were to become insolvent and all consumers were to die
for lack of goods suﬃcient to meet their subsistence needs, the ACE Trading World would
exhibit an “unchanging condition” in the sense of an unchanged state,
X(T +1 ) = X(T) for T = ¯ T +1 ,. . . ,TMax. (2)
Apart from this dire situation, however, the ACE Trading World has four features that
tend to promote continual changes in the data components of X(T): (a) the ﬁrms’ use
of choice probability distributions to select supply oﬀers; (b) ﬁrm learning (updating of
choice probability distributions); (c) changing ﬁrm capacity levels in response to changing
proﬁt conditions; and (d) resort by ﬁrms and consumers to “coin ﬂips” to resolve indiﬀerent
choices. Consequently, although a stationary-state equilibrium in the sense of condition (2)
is possible, it is too restrictive to be of great interest.
More interesting than this rariﬁed stationary-state form of balance are conceptions of
equilibrium for the ACE Trading World that entail an “unchanging condition” with regard
to more global world properties. Some of these possible conceptions are listed below.
• The economy exhibits an unchanging carrying capacity, in the sense that it supports
an unchanged number of solvent ﬁrms and viable consumers over time.
• The economy exhibits continual market clearing, in the sense that demand equals
supply in the markets for hash and beans over time.
• The economy exhibits an unchanging structure, in the sense that the capacity levels
(hence ﬁxed costs) of the hash and bean ﬁrms are not changing over time.
• The economy exhibits an unchanging belief pattern, in the sense that the ﬁrms’ choice
probability distributions for selection of their supply oﬀers are not changing over time.
• The economy exhibits an unchanging trade network, in the sense that who is trading
with whom, and with what regularity, is not changing over time.
• The economy exhibits a steady-state growth path, in the sense that the capacities and
production levels of the ﬁrms and the consumption levels of the consumers are growing
at constant rates over time.
Finally, it is interesting to weaken further these conceptions of equilibria to permit ap-
proximate reﬂections of these various properties. Deﬁne an idealized reference path for the
ACE Trading World to be a collection of state trajectories exhibiting one (or possibly several)
of the above-listed global properties. For example, one might consider the set E∗ of all state
trajectories exhibiting continual market clearing. For any given tolerance level τ, deﬁne a
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distance from E∗ is within τ for some suitably deﬁned distance measure.20 Given any initial
speciﬁcation for the ACE Trading World, one can then conduct multiple experimental runs
using multiple pseudo-random number seed values to determine the (possibly zero) frequency
with which the ACE Trading World enters and remains within this τ-neighborhood.
4 ACE modeling of procurement processes
In real-world economies, rival ﬁrms must actively compete for customers in order to survive
and prosper. This section focuses on six important issues entailed by this procurement
process that ACE frameworks are able to address: namely, constructive understanding; the
essential primacy of survival; strategic rivalry and market power; behavioral uncertainty and
learning; the role of conventions and organizations; and the complex interactions among
structural attributes, institutional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions. The ACE
Trading World outlined in Section 3.3 is used to illustrate key points.
4.1 Constructive understanding
If you had to construct ﬁrms and consumers capable of surviving and even prospering in a
realistically rendered economy, how would you go about it? To express this question in more
concrete terms, consider the following exercise similar to the type of exercise undertaken in
Section 3.
• Select as your benchmark case an equilibrium modeling of an economy from the eco-
nomic literature that is clearly and completely presented and that addresses some issue
you care about.
• Remove from this economic model every assumption that entails the external imposi-
tion of an equilibrium condition (e.g., market clearing assumptions, correct expecta-
tions assumptions, and so forth).
• Dynamically complete the economic model by the introduction of production, pricing,
and trade processes driven solely by interactions among the agents actually residing
within the model. These procurement processes should be both feasible for the agents
to carry out under realistic information limitations and appropriate for the types of
goods, services, and ﬁnancial assets that the agents produce and exchange.
• Deﬁne an “equilibrium” for the resulting dynamically complete economic model.
20For example, a state trajectory might be said to be within distance τ of E∗ if, for all suﬃciently large
tested T values, the discrepancy between period-T aggregate demand and period-T aggregate supply is less
than τ in absolute value for both hash and beans.
19In my experience, economics students are generally intrigued but ﬂummoxed when pre-
sented with this type of exercise because it is radically diﬀerent from the usual economic
problems their professors have asked them to consider. In particular, they ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to specify procurement processes driven solely by agent interactions and to deﬁne a cor-
respondingly appropriate concept of equilibrium. Yet the key issue is this: If economists
cannot rise to this constructive challenge, to what extent can we be said to understand the
micro support requirements for actual decentralized market economies and the manner in
which such economies might achieve an “unchanging condition”?
4.2 The essential primacy of survival
ACE modeling forces researchers to rise to the constructive challenge posed in Section 4.1.
The most immediate, dramatic, and humbling revelation ﬂowing from the ACE modeling of
economic systems is the diﬃculty of constructing economic agents capable of surviving over
time, let alone prospering.
When ﬁrms with ﬁxed costs to cover are responsible for setting their own production and
price levels, they risk insolvency. When consumers with physical requirements for food and
other essentials must engage in a search process in an attempt to secure these essentials,
they risk death. Every other objective pales relative to survival; it is lexicographically prior
to almost every other consideration.
The explicit consideration of subsistence needs also has interesting ramiﬁcations for the
analysis of social welfare. The incorporation of subsistence needs into consumer utility func-
tions induces a fundamental non-concavity in these functions at subsistence levels, i.e., where
death occurs. This invalidates many important conclusions drawn from standard utilitarian
social welfare analyses, for which concave utility and welfare functions are presumed. For
example, a comfortable outcome commonly supported by such analyses is an egalitarian re-
source distribution. Suppose, however, that consumer utility functions take the form uk(x)
=1−exp(−[x−¯ xk]) for x ≥ ¯ xk and 0 otherwise, where ¯ xk is a nonnegative subsistence need.
The maximization of a standard utilitarian social welfare function of the form W(u1,...,u K)
with dW/duk > 0 for each k will then dictate that consumers k with relatively high subsis-
tence needs ¯ xk should be permitted to die for the greater beneﬁt of consumers as a whole,
even if suﬃcient resources are available to satisfy the subsistence needs of all consumers
[Tesfatsion (1985, p. 297)]. In order to ensure survival, a right to subsistence shares must
be imposed as an additional constraint on the social welfare maximization problem, thus
throwing into question the completeness of utilitarianism as a theory of distributive justice.
Despite these observations, ﬁxed costs and subsistence needs are often assumed to be
either absent or unimportant in theoretical models of economic systems.21 Attention is
focused on economic systems assumed to be operating smoothly at their equilibrium points.
Survival is assured as a modeling assumption, not as the outcome of a process of blood, sweat,
21Important exceptions include work by researchers such as Richard Nelson, Roy Radner, Amartya Sen,
and Sidney Winter on market survival and famine - see Nelson (1995) and Radner (1998) - and work by
Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999) on endogenous growth models incorporating subsistence requirements.
20and tears. Fixed costs and subsistence needs reduce to bells and whistles of no consequence
for the model outcomes.
Agent-based modeling tools permit economists to test their ability to construct ﬁrms and
consumers capable of surviving and prospering in realistically rendered economic environ-
ments for which survival is by no means assured.
4.3 Strategic rivalry and market power
In economies organized on the basis of decentralized markets, each ﬁrm is necessarily in
rivalry with other ﬁrms for scarce consumer dollars. The production and price choices of
ﬁrms are intrinsically linked through consumer budget constraints and preferences. A ﬁrm’s
production and price choices can help attract consumers for its output by making its output
relativelycheap, or by making its output relatively abundant and hence free of stock-out risk.
In addition, a ﬁrm’s production and price choices can help to counter the relative preference
of consumers for other types of outputs.
For example, in the ACE Trading World each hash ﬁrm has to worry about the supply
oﬀers (i.e., the production and price choices) of other hash ﬁrms. A hash ﬁrm might try
to set a low price to avoid being undercut by rival hash ﬁrms. Alternatively, a hash ﬁrm
could deliberately price high with an eye to proﬁtably capturing residual hash demand from
capacity-constrained lower-price hash ﬁrms. A hash ﬁrm might also try to use its price as a
signal to other hash ﬁrms, repeatedly setting a relatively high price in an attempt to induce
implicit collusion at this price. The riskiness of these supply oﬀer strategies depends strongly
on the microstructure of the market and the learning behaviors of the other hash ﬁrms. In
particular, the initial money holdings and production capacity of a hash ﬁrm limit the degree
to which it can aﬀord to experiment with alternative supply oﬀers. Negative proﬁts must be
covered by reductions in money holdings or by sale of capacity, hence too many successive
periods with negative proﬁts will ultimately force the ﬁrm into insolvency.
Also, hash ﬁrms as a whole have to worry about setting a market price for hash that is
too high relative to the price for beans. Too high a hash price could induce potential hash
customers to instead buy beans, thus driving down hash ﬁrm proﬁts unnecessarily. Since
hash ﬁrms do not have prior knowledge of consumer demand functions or of the supply oﬀer
strategies of bean ﬁrms, they do not have prior knowledge regarding the maximum possible
proﬁts they could extract from the market through appropriate supply oﬀers. An additional
challenging but realistic complication is that each ﬁrm can increase or decrease its production
capacity over time in response to its own idiosyncratically changing ﬁnancial state, hence
a hash ﬁrm’s maximum extractable proﬁts can vary over time even if all other ﬁrms have
stationary structures and supply oﬀer strategies.
Similarly, each consumer is necessarily in rivalry with other consumers for potentially
scarce produced goods. The ﬁrms currently oﬀering the lowest prices can suﬀer stock-outs,
hence a consumer formulating her demands conditional on receiving these lowest posted
prices has no actual guarantee that her demands will be realized. If a stock-out results in a
consumer’s demand being rationed below her subsistence needs, preserving income for future
21purchases to secure these needs becomes a critical survival issue.
For example, as detailed in Section A.7 of the Appendix, consumers in the current ren-
dition of the ACE Trading World are myopic utility seekers. In each period T they submit
hash and bean demands to the ﬁrms currently posting the lowest hash and bean prices in
an attempt to maximize their period-T utility.22 If they are then rationed below subsistence
needs in one of these goods, they back down their demand for the other good in order to pre-
serve income for future purchases of the rationed good at a possibly higher price. However,
consumers do not anticipate and plan in advance for stock-out and rationing contingencies.
It would be interesting to consider alternative speciﬁcations of consumer utility-seeking
behaviors permitting consumers to display a more sophisticated awareness of the opportuni-
ties and risks they face over time. For example, if ﬁrms oﬀering the lowest possible prices are
frequently stocked out, smart consumers might plan in advance to patronize ﬁrms oﬀering
slightly higher prices in order to avoid long queue lines and stock-out risk. Alternatively,
consumers might engage in a sequential search process, one ﬁrm at a time, in which they
ﬁrst attempt to secure their subsistence needs and then revert to utility maximization once
these needs are secured. In addition, consumers might deliberately plan to save a portion of
their current money income in excess of subsistence needs expenditures as a precautionary
measure against uncertain times ahead. It is interesting how naturally one slips back into
a consideration of such practical “Keynesian” rules of thumb when procurement processes
must be constructively modeled solely in terms of agent interactions.
4.4 Behavioral uncertainty and learning
Substantial progress has been made in understanding how people learn in various social
settings captured in laboratory experiments; see, for example, Camerer (2003), Kagel and
Roth (1995), and McCabe (2003). In addition, researchers in social psychology, marketing,
and other disciplines have accumulated a wealth of empirical evidence on learning in a wide
range of natural social settings. Based on these ﬁndings, a variety of learning algorithms
have been proposed in the economics literature.23
Unfortunately, tractability problems have made it diﬃcult for economists to incorporate
these insights on learning into their analytical models. In current economic theory it is
common to see the problem of learning short-circuited by the imposition of a rational ex-
pectations assumption. Rational expectations in its weakest form assumes that agents on
average make optimal use of their information, in the sense that their subjective expecta-
tions coincide on average with objectively true expectations conditional on this information.
This weak-form rational expectations assumption is in accordance with a postulate most
22Thus, consumers display an extreme form of “quasi-hyperbolic discounting:” namely, current utility
outcomes always have a weight of 1 whereas future utility outcomes always have a weight of 0. Recent
experimental evidence appears to support quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the less extreme form (1,β,β,... )
with 0 <β<1; see Sections 1-4 (pp. 351-365) of Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
23See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aemind.htm for annotated pointers to some of this research.
Detailed surveys of the economics learning literature can be found in Brenner (2006) and Duﬀy (2006).
22economists ﬁnd uncontroversial: namely, that agents continually act to bring their expec-
tations into consistency with their information.24 Nevertheless, it considerably strengthens
this postulate by assuming that agents’ expectations are consistent with their information.
Moreover, economists typically apply rational expectations in an even stronger form re-
quiring optimal usage of information plus the inclusion in this information of all relevant
information about the world.
Whatever speciﬁc form it takes, the rational expectations assumption requires uncer-
tainty to be ultimately calculable for all agents in terms of “objectively true” conditional
probability distributions as an anchor for the commonality of beliefs. Expectations can diﬀer
across agents conditioning on the same information only by noise terms with no systematic
relationship to this information, so that these noise terms wash out when average or “rep-
resentative” expectations are considered. This rules out strategic multi-agent situations in
which a major source of uncertainty is behavioral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty regarding
what actions other agents will take.
For example, ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World have no prior knowledge of consumer
demand functions or of the cost functions and capacities of other ﬁrms. An added compli-
cation is that the structure of the ACE Trading World can change endogenously over time
if individual ﬁrms ever ﬁnd themselves in proﬁt conditions that induce them to change their
capacities and hence their ﬁxed costs. Consequently, ﬁrms must operate under a great deal
of behavioral and structural uncertainty. Even if each ﬁrm were to have complete and correct
information about structural conditions, the behavioral uncertainty would remain. This is
because structural aspects by no means determine “objectively true” expectations for the
supply oﬀer strategies of other ﬁrms. Rather, such expectations could be self-referential,
depending in part on what one ﬁrm expects other ﬁrms expect about its own expectations,
and so on, resulting in an inherent expectational indeterminacy.
The proﬁt-seeking hash and bean ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World therefore face ex-
tremely challenging learning problems. Despite profound behavioral and structural uncer-
tainty, they must somehow decide on supply oﬀers in each successive period. These choices
require the resolution of a trade-oﬀ in each period between two competing objectives:
• Information Exploitation: Select production and price levels today so that my
current expected proﬁts are as high as possible, given my current information.
• Information Exploration: Select production and price levels today in an attempt to
learn more about my economic environment, even if this adversely aﬀects my current
proﬁts, so that my future expected proﬁts can be increased.
The manner in which the ﬁrms resolve this trade-oﬀ in each successive period determinestheir
long-run fate. Will they survive or become insolvent? If they survive, just how proﬁtable
will they be?
24The strong psychological evidence supporting the prevalence of cognitive dissonance suggests that
economists should exercise caution even with regard to this postulate.
23Given the importance of learning to ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World, a key issue is
whether there is any one “best” way for ﬁrms to learn. The theoretical literature on multi-
agent learning is currently in its infancy and oﬀers little guidance at this point in time.
However, the experimental ﬁndings reported by ACE researchers to date suggest the an-
swer might well be negative. The main diﬃculty is the prevalence of two-way feedbacks in
multi-agent settings such as the ACE Trading World. The relative performance of a learn-
ing method employed by any one particular agent tends to depend heavily on the current
behavior of other agents as well as on current structural and institutional conditions. These
conditioning factors can, in turn, undergo change in response to actions taken by the agent
employing the learning method. Even if a Nash equilibrium in learning strategies were to
exist, there is no particular reason to expect that it would be unique or Pareto optimal.
Indeed, it is not even clear what information an ACE Trading World ﬁrm should optimally
take into account during the course of its learning. For example, as detailed in Section A.4
of the Appendix, hash and bean ﬁrms in the current rendition of the ACE Trading World
are assumed to rely on a simple form of reinforcement learning to make their supply oﬀer
selections in each period. The information requirements of this learning method are minimal.
Each ﬁrm keeps track of its own proﬁt history, and each ﬁrm uses knowledge of its own
cost function in order to exclude consideration of supply oﬀer selections that would result
in negative proﬁts for sure. One potentially valuable piece of information ignored by this
learning method is the length of the queue lines faced by each ﬁrm during the course of
the price discovery process. A ﬁrm might be able to use the length of its queue lines, in
conjunction with its production levels, to obtain excess demand estimates that could be used
to better inform both its supply oﬀer selections and its capacity (dis)investment decisions.
Another type of information currently ignored by ﬁrms is observations on the supply oﬀer
selections of other ﬁrms.
Could a hash or bean ﬁrm necessarily improve its proﬁt performance by making use of
additional information either alone or in conjunction with other ﬁrms? The experimental
ﬁndings reported by Axelrod (1984) suggest that transparency can be an important crite-
rion for successful performance in multi-agent settings.25 A potential downside for a ﬁrm
attempting to use multiple sources of information to inform its selections is that its actions
and intentions might become so opaque to other agents that opportunities for mutually
beneﬁcial coordination are lost. In this case the proﬁts of the ﬁrm could actually diminish.
On the ﬂip side of this issue, Gode and Sunder (1993) have demonstrated that even
highly uninformed Zero-Intelligence (ZI) traders can perform well in certain types of market
25In 1979 Robert Axelrod posed an intriguing question: What type of strategy (if any) ensures good
individual performance over the long haul when one is engaging in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
play in round-robin fashion with multiple strangers whose strategies are not known in advance? Axelrod
explored this question by conducting an IPD computer tournament with IPD strategies solicited from game
experts from all over the world. The winner of this tournament was the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy submitted
by Anatol Rapoport. The TFT strategy is simply stated: Start by cooperating, then do whatever your rival
did in the previous iteration. As stressed by Axelrod (1984), one key reason for the success of TFT in this
tournament appears to have been its transparency; other players could easily determine that cooperation
with TFT would induce cooperation in turn.
24settings. Speciﬁcally, Gode and Sunder conducted continuous double-auction experiments
with computational traders. They observed that high market eﬃciency was generally ob-
tained as long as the traders acted within their budget constraints, abided by an auction
protocol requiring current bids/oﬀers to be improvements over the currently best bids/oﬀers
[p. 122], and satisﬁed the behavioral assumption that higher-value/lower-cost units were al-
ways bid/oﬀered ﬁrst [p. 122 and footnote 5, p. 131]. Gode and Sunder concluded that the
high market eﬃciency they observed in their experiments derived from the structural and
institutional aspects of the auction and not from the learning capabilities of the auction
traders per se.26
Later research has raised some cautions about the generality of these early Gode-Sunder
ﬁndings; see, e.g., Cliﬀ and Bruton (1997) and Gode and Sunder (1997). For example,
Cliﬀ and Bruton consider Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) traders who systematically vary their
current bids/oﬀers on the basis of information about the bid/oﬀer levels last accepted in the
market. In comparison with Gode-Sunder’s original ZI traders, Cliﬀ and Bruten ﬁnd that
the performance of their modestly more informed ZIP traders is signiﬁcantly closer to the
eﬃcient performance of human traders typically observed in human-subject double-auction
experiments. Nevertheless, the basic conclusion reached in the original Gode-Sunder work
still stands: good market performance should not automatically be attributed to trader
learning and rationality.
Finally, timing is another potentially critical aspect of learning. In the current rendi-
tion of the ACE Trading World, ﬁrms are assumed to update their supply oﬀer selections
at the beginning of every period in response to last period’s proﬁt outcomes. Moreover,
their state-conditioned proﬁt allocation methods dictate that they should undertake capac-
ity investment whenever their proﬁts are positive and their current demand exceeds their
current capacity. However, in a decision environment as highly uncertain as the ACE Trading
World, some degree of inertia could be beneﬁcial. For example, multiple positive excess de-
mand observations would increase conﬁdence in the wisdom of undergoing a costly capacity
expansion.
Intensive experimentation with multi-agent economic models such as the ACE Trading
World might help shed additional light on these empirically important learning issues.
4.5 The role of conventions and organizations
In the Walrasian equilibrium model, the ﬁctitious Walrasian Auctioneer pricing mechanism
ensures buyers are eﬃcientlymatched with sellers at market clearing prices. In the real world,
it is the procurement processes implemented by ﬁrms, consumers, and other agents actually
residing within the world that drive economic outcomes. These procurement processes must
allow for a wide range of contingencies in order for economies to function properly.
In particular, buyers and sellers must be able to continue on with their production,
pricing, and trade activities even if markets fail to clear. The ACE Trading World illustrates
26See Duﬀy (2006) for an extensive discussion of the ﬁndings by Gode and Sunder (1993).
25the minimal types of additional scaﬀolding required to support orderly procurement despite
the occurrence of excess supply or demand.
Consider, ﬁrst, the possibility of excess supply in the ACE Trading World. Excess supply
increases a ﬁrm’s risk of insolvency because the ﬁrm’s revenues, hence proﬁts, are less than
anticipated. In accordance with the market protocol governing the insolvency of ﬁrms, a
ﬁrm must exit the economy when and if it sustains negative proﬁts that wipe out its current
money holdings and capacity and leave it with a non-positive net worth. Since amortized
ﬁxed costs must be covered in each period regardless of a ﬁrm’s production level, a decision
by a ﬁrm to refrain from production is not a safe harbor. Moreover, inventory management
is not an eﬀective counter to over-production because goods are perishable.
What ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World can do to try to lessen their insolvency risk
is to implement state-conditioned proﬁt allocation methods. As illustrated concretely in
Section A.3 of the Appendix, these methods determine how the proﬁts of the ﬁrms - whether
positive or negative - are to be allocated among money (dis)savings, capacity (dis)investment,
and (nonnegative) dividend payments to shareholders. In particular, a proﬁt allocation
method permits a ﬁrm to tailor its production capacity to its normal demand in order to
control the frequency of both stock-outs (missed proﬁt opportunities) and unsold goods
(unnecessarily high production costs).
For example, if a ﬁrm ﬁnds itself in an excess capacity state relative to current demand, it
can channel more of any positive proﬁts into money holdings instead of dividend payments
or capacity investment, or even sell oﬀ capacity if its current demand level is expected
to persist. Money holdings provide a way for a ﬁrm to store value as a buﬀer against
future adverse revenue shocks. Capacity investment also provides a store of value for the
ﬁrm, hence a buﬀer against unanticipated declines in future revenues; but capacity entails a
carrying charge through ﬁxed costs. On the downside, a curtailment of dividends represents
a curtailment of consumer incomes, which could cause a decline in the future demand for
the ﬁrm’s goods. These competing considerations must all be weighed in the selection of an
appropriate proﬁt allocation method.
Consider, next, the possibility that ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World experience excess
demands for their goods. The ﬁrms have to determine their supply oﬀers in each period
on the basis of limited information about consumer demands and about the simultaneous
supply oﬀers of other ﬁrms. Consequently, it is possible that ﬁrms posting relatively low
prices will ﬁnd their demand exceeds their supply. A ﬁrm facing this contingency must have
some way of determining how to ration its limited goods among its current customers.
Each ﬁrm in the ACE Trading World is assumed to implement rationing in accordance
with its own rationing method. These rationing methods can have a potentially signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the resulting world dynamics. Consumers must consume enough goods in every
period in order to meet their subsistence needs. As dictated by the market protocol governing
consumer price discovery, consumers in every period search for the lowest posted goods prices
in an attempt to meet and even exceedtheir subsistence needs in accordance with their utility
maximization objectives. Consumers who fail to meet their subsistence needs by the end of
the period will die.
26Suppose, for example, that all ﬁrms in the ACE Trading World implement the Random
Queue Rationing Method described in Section A.7 of the Appendix. This rationing method
allocates limited goods among current customers through random customer selection, with-
out any regard for diﬀerential customer attributes (e.g., diﬀerential needs and incomes). Un-
der such a method, lower-income customers with currently unmet subsistence needs could
face a signiﬁcant risk of death; any failure to meet their subsistence needs through the cur-
rent ﬁrm means they will next have to try to meet their needs by patronizing a higher-priced
ﬁrm. If, instead, ﬁrms were to implement rationing methods systematically biased in favor of
higher-income customers, the risk of death faced by lower-income customers would become
even greater.
Imagine how diﬀerent the dynamics of the ACE Trading World might be if, in addition
to private ﬁrms, the world also included non-proﬁt ﬁrms constituted as government service
agencies speciﬁcally and publicly charged with providing priority service to lower-income cus-
tomers. Nevertheless, even the presence of such agencies might not be suﬃcient to eliminate
subsistence risk for consumers. If the agencies cannot aﬀord to produce (or acquire) enough
goods to service all of the subsistence needs of their customers, they will face painfully dif-
ﬁcult “life-boat ethics” decisions regarding who will be permitted to live and who will be
permitted to die.
Rationing methods are not viewed as critical aspects of procurement in economies with
abundant goods and infrequent stock-outs. Nevertheless, as the ACE Trading World sug-
gests, rationing methods could potentially inﬂuence the growth paths of economies by aﬀect-
ing the allocation of resources and even life and death itself. An economy’s current rationing
methods might not appear to matter only because they have mattered so much in the past.
In summary, in order to enable procurement to proceed in the face of excess supply or
demand, the ACE Trading World relies on a support system of public and private methods:
namely, insolvency protocol, price discovery protocol, proﬁt allocation methods, and ra-
tioning methods. The implicit assumption is that all agents accept the outcomes determined
in part by these methods. Insolvent ﬁrms accept they must exit the economy. Consumers
accept that their dividend payments might vary with proﬁt levels, that queue lines will form
before the ﬁrms posting the lowest prices, and that their actual purchases might in some
circumstances be rationed below their planned purchases. Consequently, these methods are
in fact conventions, i.e., generally accepted practices.
Clearly, however, the ACE Trading World exaggerates the coordination problems faced by
ﬁrms and consumers in real-world decentralizedmarket economies. Apart from the Walrasian
Auctioneer pricing mechanism, Walrasian equilibrium models are free of any organizational
structure. Consequently, in trying to retain as much as possible of the basic features of the
Walrasian equilibrium model outlined in Section 3.1 apart from equilibrium assumptions,
the ACE Trading World is forced to rely on conventions to ﬁll out the needed scaﬀolding to
ensure orderly procurement.
As stressed by Clower and Howitt (1996), Colander (1996), Howitt (2006), and Leijon-
hufvud (2006), real-world decentralized market economies have evolved a wide variety of
organizations to reduce coordination problems. For example, even the humdrum retail store
27dramatically facilitates orderly buyer-seller exchange through the reduction of transaction
and information costs. In the current ACE Trading World, traders can only buy and sell
hash and beans through bilateral trades. The coordination problems faced by these traders
would be ameliorated if hash and beans could also be purchased through retail grocery stores.
ACE frameworks can incorporate realistically rendered institutional aspects of economies
with relative ease. Consequently, ACE researchers are increasingly focusing on the role of
conventions and organizations in relation to economic performance.27
4.6 Interactions among attributes, institutions, and behaviors
Recallthat an agent in an ACE model is an economic,social, biological, or physical entity rep-
resented as a bundle of data and methods. An agent’s data might include information about
the attributes of other agents as well as itself. An agent’s methods might include socially
instituted codes of conduct (e.g., market protocols and other institutional arrangements) as
well as behavioral modes private to the agent. Anyone who has hands-on experience with the
construction of ACE models, and hence with the speciﬁcation of data and methods for mul-
tiple agents in a dynamic social setting, is sure to have encountered the following modeling
conundrum: everything seems to depend on everything else.
Consider, for example, the complicated feedbacks that arise for ﬁrms in the ACE Trading
World. The learning methods used by ﬁrms to select their supply oﬀers determine in part
their proﬁt outcomes, which in turn aﬀect their capacity investment decisions and hence
their size and cost attributes. On the other hand, the size and cost attributes of ﬁrms aﬀect
their feasible supply oﬀer domains, which in turn constrain their learning methods. Similarly
complicated feedbacks arise between ﬁrms and consumers. The chance that any particular
consumer will survive and prosper depends strongly on supply conditions, in particular on
the number and types of supply oﬀers posted by ﬁrms. In turn, the survival and prosperity
of ﬁrms depends strongly on demand conditions, and hence on the survival and prosperity
of consumers. Moreover, all of these feedbacks among attributes and private behaviors
must play out within the constraints imposed by market protocols and other institutional
arrangements.
Given these complex interactions, it is generally not possible to conclude for an ACE
model that a particular attribute will give an agent an absolute advantage over time, or
that a particular method is optimally conﬁgured for an agent in an absolute sense. The
advantage or optimality accruing to an attribute or method at any given time generally
depends strongly on the current conﬁguration of attributes and methods across agents.
In principle, using agent-based tools, a modeler can (if desired) permit any or all agent
attributes and methods to vary over time. These variations could be the result of innate or
external forces for change, or they could result from deliberate actions undertaken by agents
in response to received or acquired data. In short, when in doubt about the exogenous
speciﬁcation of particular attributes or methods, an agent-based modeler could simply relax
27See the handbook chapters by Chang and Harrington (2006) and Young (2006) for discussions of some
of this work.
28assumptions to permit endogenous co-development. This raises an interesting nature-nurture
modeling issue: namely, which attributes and methods of agents should be viewed as part of
their core maintained identities and which attributes and methods should be permitted to
vary in response to environmental inﬂuences? Moreover, this issue arises at both individual
and population levels. How much variation should any one agent be permitted to exhibit
over time, and how much variation should be permitted across agents at any one time?
One obvious recourse for ACE researchers is to attempt to calibrate the plasticity of their
agents to empirical reality. Empirical evidence strongly indicates that structural attributes,
behaviors, and institutional arrangements have indeed co-evolved. For example, McMil-
lan (2002) uses a variety of case studies to argue that markets have both evolved from below
and been designed from above, with necessary support from rules, customs, and other insti-
tutions that have co-evolved along with the markets. It is both informative and fun to study
historically oriented works such as McMillan (2002) in order to better appreciate the extent
to which attributes, institutions, and behaviors have undergone signiﬁcant change over time.
Plasticity of biological forms is a major concern of computational biologists [see, e.g., Belew
and Mitchell (1996)], and computational social scientists might ﬁnd it both productive and
thought-provoking to read some of this literature as well.
Another recourse for ACE researchers is more normative in nature. If certain aspects of
the world can be set by design, one can explore through intensive experimentation which
designs tend to induce desirable social outcomes when other aspects of the world are permit-
ted to exhibit realistic degrees of plasticity. Alternatively, exploiting the growing power of
evolutionary algorithms, one can deliberately induce the co-evolution of forms in “survival
of the ﬁttest” tournaments as a means of discovering improved design conﬁgurations. For
example, Cliﬀ (2003) explores the co-evolution of auction forms and software trader forms
for possible use in fully automated Internet markets. This work raises a number of intriguing
questions for future research. Have real-world economic institutions speciﬁcally evolved to
provide robust aggregate performance as a substitute for trader rationality? To what extent
do current economic institutions leave room for improvement by design? And to what extent
should humans in economic institutions be replaced by computational decision-makers with
designed or evolved capabilities?
Finally, given the complex interactions among attributes, institutions, and behaviors, and
our growing ability to model these interactions computationally, it seems an appropriate time
to reexamine the standards for good economic modeling. As noted by many commentators
[e.g., Clower and Howitt (1996)], economic theory currently places a great deal of emphasis on
the attributes and optimal choice behaviors of individual ﬁrms and consumers, downplaying
important institutional aspects such as markets and market-making activities. Recently,
Mirowski (2004) has argued that this emphasis on “agency” (cognitive decision-makers)
should be replaced by an emphasis on markets as evolving computational algorithms. Surely,
however, we can do better than either of these polar options alone.
Taking the broad view of “agent” adopted in ACE modeling and in agent-oriented pro-
gramming in general, institutions and structures as well as cognitive entities can be repre-
sented as persistent recognizable bundles of data and methods that interact within a compu-
29tationally constructed world. For example, as schematically depicted in Tables 1 through 4,
the ACE Trading World includes a structural agent (the World), institutional agents (Mar-
kets for hash and beans), and cognitive agents (Firms and Consumers). In short, agent-based
tools provide tremendous opportunities for economists and other social scientists to increase
the depth and breadth of the “representative agents” depicted in their models.
A key outstanding issue is whether this ability to consider more comprehensive and
empirically compelling taxonomies of representative agents will ultimately result in better
predictive, explanatory, and exploratory models. For example, for the study of decentral-
ized market economies, can the now-standard division of cognitive agents into producers,
consumers, and government policy-makers be usefully extended to include brokers, dealers,
ﬁnancial intermediaries, innovative entrepreneurs, and other forms of active market-makers?
Similarly, can the traditional division of markets into perfect competition, monopolistic com-
petition, duopoly, oligopoly, and monopoly be usefully replaced with a broader taxonomy
that better reﬂects the rich diversity of actual market forms as surveyed by McMillan (2002)?
5 Concluding remarks
The deﬁning characteristic of ACE models is their constructive grounding in the interactions
of agents, broadly deﬁned to include economic, social, biological, and physical entities. The
state of a modeled system at each point in time is given by the internal data and methods of
the agents that currently constitute the system. Starting from an initially speciﬁed system
state, the motion of the state through time is determined by endogenously generated agent
interactions.
This agent-based dynamical description, cast at a less abstract level than standard
equation-based economic models, increases the transparency and clarity of the modeling
process. A researcher can proceed directly from empirical observations on the structural
conditions, instititional arrangements, and behavioral dispositions of a real-world economic
system to a computational modeling of the system. Moreover, the emphasis on process
rather than on equilibrium solution techniques helps to ensure that empirical understanding
and creative conjecture remain the primary prerequisites for useful model design.
That said, ACE modeling is surely a complement, not a substitute, for analytical and
statistical modeling approaches. As seen in the work by Sargent (1993), ACE models can be
used to evaluate economic theories developed using these more standard tools. Can agents
indeed learn to coordinate on the types of equilibria identiﬁed in these theories and, if so,
how? If there are multiple possible equilibria, which equilibrium (if any) will turn out to be
the dominant attractor, and why? ACE models can also be used to evaluate the robustness
of these theories to relaxations of their assumptions, such as common knowledge, rational
expectations, and perfect capital markets. A key question in this regard is the extent to
which learning, institutions, and evolutionary forces might substitute for the high degree of
individual rationality assumed in standard economic theories.
More generally, the use of ACE models could facilitate the development and experimental
evaluation of integrated theories that build on theory and data from many diﬀerent ﬁelds
30of social science. With ACE tools, economists can address growth, distribution, and wel-
fare issues in a comprehensive manner encompassing a wide range of pertinent economic,
social, political, and psychological factors. It is particularly intriguing to reexamine the
broadly envisioned theories of earlier economists such as Adam Smith (1937), Joseph Schum-
peter (1934), John Maynard Keynes (1965), and Friedrich von Hayek (1948), and to consider
how these theories might now be more fully addressed in quantitative terms.
Another potentially important aspect of the ACE methodology is pedagogical. As de-
tailed in Dibble (2006), ACE models can be implemented by computational laboratories that
facilitate and encourage the systematic experimental exploration of complex economic pro-
cesses. Students can formulate experimental designs to investigate interesting propositions
of their own devising, with immediate feedback and with no original programming required.
This permits teachers and students to take an inductive open-ended approach to learning.
Exercises can be assigned for which outcomes are not known in advance, giving students an
exciting introduction to creative research. The modular form of the underlying computa-
tional laboratory software also permits students with programming backgrounds to modify
and extend the laboratory features with relative ease.28
A number of requirements must be met, however, if the potential of ACE for scientiﬁc
research is to be realized. ACE researchers need to focus on issues of importance for under-
standing economic systems. They need to construct models that capture the salient aspects
of these issues, and to use these models to formulate clearly articulated theories regarding
possible issue resolutions. They need to evaluate these theories systematically by means of
multiple controlled experiments with captured seed values to ensure replicability by other
researchers using possibly other platforms, and to report summaries of their theoretical ﬁnd-
ings in a transparent and rigorous form. Finally, they need to test their theoretical ﬁndings
against real-world data in ways that permit empirically supported theories to cumulate over
time, with each researcher’s work building appropriately on the work that has gone before.
Meeting all of these requirements is not an easy task. One possible way to facilitate the
task is interdisciplinary collaboration. Recent eﬀorts to advance collaborative research have
been encouraging. For example, Barreteau (2003) reports favorably on eﬀorts to promote
a companion modeling approach to critical policy issues such as management of renewable
resources. The companion modeling approach is an iterative participatory process involving
stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and researchers from multiple disciplines in a repeated
looping through a three-stage cycle: ﬁeld work and data analysis, model design, and com-
putational experiments. Agent-based modeling and role-playing games constitute important
aspects of this process. The objective is the management of complex problems through a
continuous learning process rather than the delivery of deﬁnitive problem solutions.29
28See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/syl308.htm for an ACE course relying heavily on computa-
tional laboratory exercises to involve students creatively in the course materials. Annotated pointers to
other ACE-related course preparations can be found at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/teachsyl.htm.
29See Janssen and Ostrom (2006) for applications of the companion modeling approach to the study of
governance mechanisms for social-ecological systems. Koesrindartoto and Tesfatsion (2004) advocate and
pursue a similar approach to the design of wholesale power markets.
31Realistically, however, communication across disciplinary lines can be diﬃcult, particu-
larly if the individuals attempting the collaboration have little or no cross-disciplinary train-
ing. As elaborated by Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006), economists and other social scientists
interested in agent-based modeling should therefore ideally acquire basic programming, sta-
tistical, and mathematical skills together with suitable training in their desired application
areas. Of these requirements, programming skills remain by far the most problematic for
economists because few graduate economic programs currently have computer programming
requirements. I would therefore like to conclude with some heart-felt exhortations from the
programming trenches.
As a professor of mathematics (as well as economics), I appreciate the beauty of classical
mathematics. However, constructive mathematics is also beautiful and, in my opinion, the
right kind of mathematics for economists and other social scientists. Constructive mathemat-
ics diﬀers from classical mathematics in its strict interpretation of the phrase “there exists”
to mean “one can construct.”30 Constructive proofs are algorithms that can, in principle,
be recast as computer programs. To master a general programming language is to acquire a
form of mathematical skill every bit as aesthetically pleasing, powerful, and practical as the
diﬀerential calculus. Indeed, for economic purposes, computer programming is in some ways
more powerful in that it facilitates the modeling of complex interactive processes involving
kinks, jumps, and other forms of discreteness imposed or induced by empirical constraints.
Consequently, programming frees us to adapt the tool to the problem rather than the prob-
lem to the tool. Every graduate economics program should incorporate general programming
language requirements. It is time.
Appendix: The ACE Trading World
This appendix presents a detailed description of the ACE Trading World outlined in Sec-
tion 3.3. See Cook and Tesfatsion (2006) for a C#/.Net implementation of the ACE Trading
World as a computational laboratory with a graphical user interface.
A.1 The economy in the initial period
The ACE Trading World is a discrete-time dynamic economy that runs during periods T =
0,1,...,TMax. The economy produces two perishable inﬁnitely-divisible goods, hash and
beans. At the beginning of the initial period T = 0 the economy consists of J(0) hash-
producing ﬁrms, N(0) bean-producing ﬁrms, and K(0) consumers.
Each hash ﬁrm j in period T = 0 has exogenously given money holdings MoneyHj(0)
and an exogenously given hash-production capacity CapHj(0). Hash ﬁrms can buy additional
hash-production capacity at an exogenously given nominal unit price of ρH. Each bean ﬁrm
n in the initial period T = 0 has exogenously given money holdings MoneyBn(0) and an
exogenously given bean-production capacity CapBn(0). Bean ﬁrms can buy additional bean-
production capacity at an exogenously given nominal unit price of ρB.
30See the “Constructive Mathematics” entry at the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy Site, accessible at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathematics-constructive/.
32Each consumer k in period T = 0 has an exogenously given lifetime money endowment
proﬁle (Endowk(T): T =0 ,1,...,TMax). Consumer k also has exogenously given subsis-
tence needs for hash and beans, ¯ hk and ¯ bk, which must be met in every period in order to
survive. Finally, the utility Uk(h,b) obtained by consumer k from consuming h ≥ ¯ hk pounds
of hash and b ≥ ¯ bk pounds of beans in any period T is given by
Uk(h,b)=( h − ¯ hk)
αk · (b −¯ bk)
[1−αk] , (3)
where the parameter αk measures consumer k’s relative preference for hash versus beans.
A.2 Activity ﬂow for hash ﬁrms in period T
At the beginning of each period T ≥ 0, each hash ﬁrm j has money holdings MoneyHj(T)
and a hash-production capacity CapHj(T). The amortized ﬁxed costs of hash ﬁrm j in period
T are proportional to its capacity:
FCostsHj(T)=fHj · CapHj(T)+FHj , (4)
where fHj and FHj are given constants. Each hash ﬁrm j selects a feasible (capacity con-
strained) hash supply hs
j(T), measured in pounds, together with a per-pound supply price





2 + RHj · h
s
j(T) + FCostHj(T), (5)
where SHj and RHj are given constants. If hash ﬁrm j then actually sells hj(T) pounds of
beans at price pHj(T) in period T, its (possibly negative) proﬁt level in period T is
ProﬁtHj(T)=pHj(T) · hj(T) − TCostHj(T). (6)
Note that a decision not to produce any hash in period T results in a proﬁt level−FCostsHj(T)
for hash ﬁrm j due to its ﬁxed costs.
At the end of each period T ≥ 0, each hash ﬁrm j calculates its period-T proﬁts
ProﬁtHj(T) and its period-T net worth
NetWorthHj(T) = MoneyHj(T)+ρH · CapHj(T) + ProﬁtHj(T) , (7)
where ρH denotes the market price for hash-production capacity. If the net worth of hash ﬁrm
j is non-positive, the ﬁrm is declared eﬀectively insolvent and it must immediately exit the
economy. If the net worth of hash ﬁrm j is positive, then the ﬁrm applies the following proﬁt
allocation method A(mHj,d Hj) to determine the disposition of its period-T proﬁts among
money (dis)savings, capacity (dis)investment, and dividend payments to shareholders.
A.3 Proﬁt allocation method for hash ﬁrm j
Capacity investment state: If period-T proﬁts ProﬁtHj(T) are nonnegative and if actual
hash sales hj(T) are at maximum capacity CapHj(T), allocate a portion mHj of period-
T proﬁts towards money holdings and the remaining portion [1 − mHj] towards capacity
33investment. Further earmark a portion dHj of the resulting money holdings as dividend
payments to be paid to shareholders at the beginning of period T + 1. Thus, in this state,
the money holdings, capacity, and dividend payments of hash ﬁrm j at the beginning of
period T + 1 are as follows:





CapHj(T + 1) = CapHj(T)+
[1−mHj]·ProﬁtHj(T)
ρH ;





Precautionary savings state: If period-T proﬁts ProﬁtHj(T) are nonnegative but actual
period-T hash sales hj(T) are less than maximum capacity CapHj(T), allocate all period-T
proﬁts to money holdings. Further earmark a portion dHj of the resulting money holdings
as dividend payments to be paid to shareholders at the beginning of period T + 1. Thus,
in this state, the money holdings, capacity, and dividend payments of hash ﬁrm j at the
beginning of period T + 1 are as follows:





CapHj(T + 1) = CapHj(T);





Contractionary state: If period-T proﬁts ProﬁtHj(T) are negative, use period-T money
holdings to cover as much of these negative proﬁts as possible. If necessary, sell period-T
capacity to cover any remaining negative proﬁts. Do not distribute any dividend payments
to shareholders at the beginning of period T + 1. Thus, in this state, the money holdings,
capacity, and dividend payments of hash ﬁrm j at the beginning of period T + 1 are as
follows. Let IHj(T) denote the indicator function deﬁned by
IHj(T)=
(
1 if MoneyHj(T) + ProﬁtHj(T) ≥ 0;
0 otherwise .
34Then:31










DivHj(T +1 ) = 0 .
A.4 Learning for hash ﬁrms
Representation of hash ﬁrm j’s supply oﬀers:
A possible supply oﬀer (h,p) for hash ﬁrm j at the beginning of any period T consists of a
hash production levelh and a unit price p. These supply oﬀers can usefully be expressed in an
alternative form. By assumption, hash ﬁrm j in period T cannot post a negative production
level or a production level in excess of its current (positive) capacity level CapHj(T). Conse-
quently, a choice of a feasible production level h in period T can alternatively be expressed






By construction, the capacity percentage (8) lies between 0 and 1.
Also, given any feasible production level h, a choice of a feasible price p in period T can
alternatively be expressed as a choice of a price-cost margin, or mark-up for short. This
mark-up is deﬁned to be the percentage diﬀerence between the price p and the marginal
cost of producing h. More precisely, using the total cost function speciﬁed for hash ﬁrms
in Section A.2 above, let MCHj(h)=2 SHjh + RHj denote hash ﬁrm j’s marginal cost of
producing h. Then the mark-up corresponding to any feasible supply oﬀer (h,p) for hash




for p>0 , (9)
with MarkUpHj(h,0) = −1000. As long as hash ﬁrm j never chooses to supply hash either
at a zero price or at a price below marginal cost, the mark-up (9) will be bounded between
0 and 1 for all of its supply oﬀers.32 Henceforth, the feasible supply oﬀers of hash ﬁrm j in
each period T ≥ 0 will be assumed to take the form (CapPercent,MarkUp).
31The following relationships imply, by construction, that a ﬁrm with a positive net worth (7) at the end
of period T cannot have a non-positive capacity at the beginning of period T + 1. Consequently, a ﬁrm
either exits the economy at the end of period T with a non-positive net worth or has a positive capacity at
the beginning of period T +1 .
32This deﬁnition for mark-up coincides with the well-known “Lerner Index” used in industrial organization
studies to measure market power in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets; see Tirole (2003, pp. 219-220).
35Hash ﬁrm j’s learning problem:
Hash ﬁrm j’s learning problem involves two basic decisions: (i) How to select a supply
oﬀer in the initial period T = 0; and (ii) when and how to change a previous supply oﬀer.
Assuming it sells all it produces, hash ﬁrm j can attempt to secure higher proﬁts by increasing
its capacity percentage given its current mark-up, increasing its mark-up given its current
capacity percentage, or increasing both its capacity percentage and its mark-up. However,
hash ﬁrm j must make its supply oﬀers in the face of a high degree of uncertainty about
the structure of the economy and the behavior of other agents. Consequently, a danger is
that not all produced units will be sold. In this case the revenues of hash ﬁrm j could be
insuﬃcient to cover its total costs of production. Indeed, overly aggressive experimentation
with supply oﬀers could eventually result in forced capacity sales or even insolvency.
Intuitively, then, a cautious approach to learning seems warranted for hash ﬁrm j in
the ACE Trading World. One such cautious approach is reinforcement learning (RL); see
Sutton and Barto (1998). The basic idea underlying RL is that the tendency to implementan
action should be strengthened (reinforced) if it produces favorable results and weakened if it
produces unfavorable results. Game theorists have begun to explore the use of RL to explain
experimental data obtained from human subjects who are learning to play repeated games
in laboratory settings involving multiple strategically-interacting players. For example, in
Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and Erev (1995), the authors develop an RL algorithm
able to track successfully the intermediate-term behavior of human subjects observed by the
authors for a particular test suite of repeated games.
A variation of the Roth-Erev RL algorithm - hereafter referred to as the VRE learning
algorithm - is one possible learning method that can be speciﬁed for ﬁrms in the ACE Trading
World. A brief outline of this VRE learning algorithm will now be given for an arbitrary
hash ﬁrm j.
The VRE learning algorithm for hash ﬁrm j:
Suppose hash ﬁrm j can choose from among ZHj feasible supply oﬀers in each period T ≥ 0.
In the initial period T=0, the initial propensity of hash ﬁrm j to choose its ith feasible
supply oﬀer is given by a nonnegative initial propensity qji(0), i =1 ,...,Z Hj. These initial
propensities are assumed to be equal valued. That is, it is assumed there exists a constant
value qHj(0) such that
qji(0) = qHj(0) for all feasible supply oﬀers i. (10)
Now consider the beginning of an arbitrary period T ≥ 0 in which the propensity of hash
ﬁrm j to choose feasible supply oﬀer i is given by qji(T). The choice probability that hash






In (11), CHj is a cooling parameter that aﬀects the degree to which hash ﬁrm j makes use of
propensity values in determining its choice probabilities. As CHj →∞ , then pji(T) → 1/ZHj
for each i, so that in the limit hash ﬁrm j pays no attention to propensity values in forming
its choice probabilities. On the other hand, as CHj → 0, the choice probabilities (11) become
increasingly peaked over the particular supply oﬀers i having the highest propensity values,
thereby increasing the probability that these supply oﬀers will be chosen.
At the end of each period T ≥ 0, the current propensity qji(T) that hash ﬁrm j associates
with each feasible supply oﬀer i is updated in accordance with the following rule. Let i0 denote
the supply oﬀer that was actually selected and posted for period T, and let Proﬁtji0(T)
denote the proﬁts (positive or negative) attained by hash ﬁrm j in period T following its
actual choice of supply oﬀer i0. Then, for each feasible supply oﬀer i,34






[1 − eHj] · Proﬁtji0(T)i fi = i0 ;
eHj · qji(T)/[ZHj − 1] if i 6= i0 .
(13)
Equations (12) and (13) clarify how the settings for the initial propensity values qji(0) in
(10) for period T = 0 determine initial proﬁt aspiration levels for ﬁrm j’s supply oﬀer choices
i. More generally, for any T ≥ 0, the propensity qji0(T) of ﬁrm j to choose supply oﬀer i0 in
period T tends to increase or decrease for period T +1 depending on whether ﬁrm j’s realized
proﬁts from choice of i0 in period T are higher or lower than qji0(T). The introduction of the
recency parameter rHj in (12) acts as a damper on the growth of the propensities over time.
The experimentation parameter eHj in (13) permits reinforcement to spill over to some extent
33In the original RL algorithm developed by Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and Erev (1995), the choice
probabilities are deﬁned in terms of relative propensity levels. Here, instead, use is made of a “simulated
annealing” formulation in terms of exponentials. As will be seen below in (12), in the current context
the propensity values qji(T) can take on negative values if suﬃciently large negative proﬁt outcomes are
experienced. The use of exponentials in (11) ensures that the choice probabilities pji(T) remain well deﬁned
even in this event.
34As in Nicolaisen et al. (2001), the response function appearing in (12) modiﬁes the response function
appearing in the original RL algorithm developed by Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and Erev (1995). The
modiﬁcationis introduced to ensure that learning (updating of choice probabilities) occurs even in response to
zero-proﬁt outcomes, which are particularly likely to arise in initial periods when hash ﬁrm j is just beginning
to experiment with diﬀerent supply oﬀers and failures to trade tend to be frequent. See Koesrindartoto (2002)
for a detailed discussion and experimental exploration of the zero-proﬁt updating problem with the original
Roth-Erev learning algorithm. See Nicolaisen et al. (2001) for a detailed motivation, presentation, and
experimental application of the modiﬁed response function in (12).
37from a chosen supply oﬀer to other supply oﬀers to encourage continued experimentation
with various supply oﬀers in the early stages of the learning process.
Hash ﬁrm j faces a trade-oﬀ in each period T between information exploitation and
information exploration. The VRE learning algorithm resolves this trade-oﬀ by ensuring
continual exploration, typically at a declining rate. More precisely, under the VRE learning
algorithm, note that hash ﬁrm j in period T does not necessarily choose a supply oﬀer with
the highest accumulated proﬁts to date. Given a suitably small value for eHj, selected supply
oﬀers generating the highest accumulated proﬁts tend to have a relatively higher probability
of being chosen, but there is always a chance that other supply oﬀers will be chosen instead.
This ensures that hash ﬁrm j continues to experiment with new supply oﬀers to some degree,
even if its choice probability distribution becomes peaked at a particular selected supply oﬀer
because of relativelygood proﬁt outcomes. This helps to reduce the risk of premature ﬁxation
on suboptimal supply oﬀers in the early stages of the decision process when relatively few
supply oﬀers have been tried.
In summary, the complete VRE learning algorithm applied to hash ﬁrm j is fully char-
acterized once user-speciﬁed values are provided for the following ﬁve learning parameters:
the number ZHj of feasible supply oﬀers; the initial propensity value qHj(0) in (10); the
cooling parameter CHj in (11); the recency parameter rHj in (12); and the experimentation
parameter eHj in (13).
A.5 Activity ﬂow and learning for bean ﬁrms
The discussion of basic activity ﬂow and learning for hash ﬁrms in Sections A.2 through A.4
applies also for the bean ﬁrms. All that is needed is a change of subscripts from Hj, H, and
j to Bn, B, and n, as well as a change of quantity designations from h to b. See Section A.8
below for a classiﬁcation of variables for the ACE Trading World that includes the basic
exogenous and endogenous variables pertaining to the bean ﬁrms.
A.6 Activity ﬂow for consumers in period T
The income Inck(0) of each consumer k at the beginning of period T = 0 consists solely
of her exogenously given money endowment, Endowk(0). The income Inck(T) of each alive
consumer k at the beginning of each period T>0 comes from three sources: unintended sav-
ings from period T −1; an exogenous money endowment Endowk(T); and dividend payments
distributed by ﬁrms.
More precisely, let Expk(T −1) denote the total expenditure of consumer k on hash and
beans during period T −1, and let the unintended savings of consumer k from period T −1
be denoted by
Savk(T) = Inck(T − 1) − Expk(T − 1) . (14)
Let J(T) and N(T) denote the number of eﬀectively solvent hash and bean ﬁrms at the
beginning of period T, and let K(T) denote the number of alive consumers at the beginning
of period T. Then the total income Inck(T) of consumer k at the beginning of period T
38takes the form















Consumers seek to survive and prosper in period T by participating in the following
price-discovery process.
A.7 Consumer price discovery process in period T
The period-T price discovery process begins as soon as each eﬀectively solvent hash and
bean ﬁrm has publicly posted its period-T supply oﬀer consisting of a production level and
a unit price. Any ﬁrm that stocks out of goods during the course of the period-T price
discovery process immediately has its supply oﬀer removed from posting. Consequently, the
lowest posted hash and bean prices either stay the same or rise during the course of the price
discovery process; they never fall.
As explained more fully below, the period-T price discovery process consists of a sequence
of rounds. The process comes to a halt as soon as either all ﬁrms are stocked out (hence no
posted supply oﬀers remain) or the unspent income levels of all consumers still participating
in the process have been reduced to zero (hence no positive demand remains). The total
hash and bean amounts actually purchased by each consumer k during the course of the
period-T price discovery process are denoted by hk(T) and bk(T).
Consumers who exit or ﬁnish the period-T price discovery process with positive unmet
subsistence needs die at the end of period T. Their unspent money holdings (if any) are
then lost to the economy, but their stock shares are distributed equally among all remaining
(alive) consumers at the beginning of period T +1 .
A typical price-discovery round for an arbitrary consumer k:
Suppose at least one ﬁrm has not stocked out and that the currently unspent portion Inc
∗
k
of consumer k’s period-T income is positive. Let ¯ h∗
k and ¯ b∗
k denote consumer k’s current net
subsistence needs for hash and beans, i.e., her basic subsistence needs ¯ hk and ¯ bk net of any
hash and bean purchases she has made in previous rounds of the period-T price discovery
process. Finally, let pL
H denote the currently lowest posted price for hash if any hash ﬁrms
are still posting supply oﬀers, and similarly for pL
B.
Suppose all hash ﬁrms have stocked out but at least one bean ﬁrm has not stocked out.
If either ¯ h∗




k, consumer k exits the price discovery process. Otherwise,












Conversely, suppose at least one hash ﬁrm has not stocked out but all bean ﬁrms have
stocked out. If either pL
H · ¯ h∗
k > Inc
∗
k or ¯ b∗
k > 0, consumer k exits the price discovery process.

























fails to hold, consumer k exits the price discovery process. Otherwise, consumer k chooses
demands hd
k and bd

































and the subsistence constraints
h
d




k ≥ ¯ b
∗
k .
Since condition (18) holds by assumption, the solution to this utility maximization problem
yields demands hd
k ≥ ¯ h∗
k and bd
k ≥ ¯ b∗




k =[ 1 − αk] · ¯ h
∗















k = αk ·¯ b
∗













If consumer k’s net subsistence need h∗
k (or b∗
k) is negative in value, this indicates that
consumer k’s purchases of hash (or beans) in previous rounds of the price discovery process
have been more than suﬃcient to cover her basic subsistence needs ¯ hk (or ¯ bk). In this
case, one (but not both) of consumer k’s current demands hd
k and bd
k could be negative.35
This would indicate that, at the currently lowest posted prices, consumer k would actually
prefer to sell some of the hash (or beans) she purchased in previous rounds of the period-T
price discovery process. This is not allowed. Consequently, if either of consumer k’s initially
calculated demands hd
k and bd
k in (20) and (21) is negative, it is assumed that consumer k then
resets this demand to 0 and and redirects all of her unspent income entirely toward demand
for the other good. The demands of consumer k for this round of the price discovery process
are thus determined in accordance with the following successive assignment statements:
hd
k = max{0,h d
k} ;
bd














35Since consumer k’s utility function is strictly increasing in hash and bean consumption over her
subsistence-constrained budget set, she would never simultaneously choose negative demands for both hash
and beans. She would only choose a negative demand for one of these goods if this “sale” permitted a greater
positive demand for the other.
40After consumer k determines her demands hd
k and bd
k for hash and beans either from
(16) or (17) in the case of a good stock-out or from the above assignment statements in
the case neither good is stocked out, she immediately conveys any positive demands to the
hash and/or bean ﬁrms who are oﬀering the currently lowest posted prices pL
H and/or pL
B.
If multiple hash (bean) ﬁrms are oﬀering the currently lowest posted hash (bean) price,
consumer k randomly decides which of these ﬁrms to patronize.
If a hash or bean ﬁrm cannot meet its current demand, it implements the following
rationing method:
Random Queue Rationing Method: Given excess demand for my good, I ﬁrst
randomly order my current customers into a queue line. I then attempt to satisfy
each customer’s demand in turn, to the fullest extent possible. All rationed
amounts oﬀered to consumers must be nonnegative.
If consumer k is oﬀered rationed amounts that do not satisfy fully her demands hd
k and bd
k for
hash and beans at the currently lowest posted prices pL
H and pL
B, her ﬁrst concern must be her
survival. The primary issue is whether she is at least able to cover her net subsistence needs
under rationing. If not, she will need to adjust her purchases under rationing to preserve as
much income as she can in an attempt to satisfy her net subsistence needs in the next round
of the price discovery process.
Thus, consumer k’s actual purchased amounts in the current round of the price discovery
process (as opposed to her demands) are determined by her speciﬁc state, as follows.
State I: No rationing
Consumer k satisﬁes fully her demands hd
k and bd
k for hash and beans, i.e., she is
not rationed. Her actual purchased amounts are then hk = hd
k and bk = bd
k.
State II: All needs met under rationing










k. In this case, her actual purchased amounts are hk =
hR
k and bk = bR
k .
State III: One need not met under rationing





and exactly one of these amounts is not suﬃcient to cover her net subsistence
need. In this case she adjusts down her demand for the other good to her net
subsistence need (if positive) or to 0 (otherwise) in order to preserve as much
income as possible for the next price discovery round. Speciﬁcally, if hR
k is not
41suﬃcient to cover h∗
k, then bd
k is adjusted down to bA
k = max{0,b ∗
k} and her
actual purchased amounts are hk = hR
k and bk = bA
k . Alternatively, if bR
k is not
suﬃcient to cover b∗
k, then hd
k is adjusted down to hA
k = max{0,h ∗
k} and her actual
purchased amounts are hk = hA
k and bk = bR
k .
State IV: Both needs not met under rationing
Consumer k is oﬀered hash and beans in rationed amounts hR
k and bR
k , neither
of which is suﬃcient to cover her net subsistence needs. In this case her actual
purchased amounts are hk = hR
k and bk = bR
k .
At the end of the current price discovery round, consumer k updates her unspent income
Inc
∗
k and her net subsistence needs h∗
k and b∗











k − hk ;
b∗
k = b∗
k − bk .
If Inc
∗
k = 0, consumer k exits the price discovery process. Otherwise, she enters into the next
price discovery round, which proceeds as described above for the previous price discovery
round.
A.8 Classiﬁcation of variables
NOTE: Only variables persisting at least one time period are listed in the following
classiﬁcation. Locally scoped variables temporarily introduced to carry out method imple-
mentations are not included.
Exogenous variables:
Initial economy data:
TMax > 0; J(0) > 0; N(0) > 0; K(0) > 0; ρH > 0; ρB > 0.
Initial ﬁrm data: (j=1, ...,J(0); n=1, ...,N(0))
MoneyHj(0) ≥ 0; CapHj(0) > 0; qHj(0);
MoneyBn(0) ≥ 0; CapBn(0) > 0; qBn(0);
SHj ≥ 0; RHj > 0; fHj ≥ 0; FHj ≥ 0; ZHj > 0; CHj > 0;
0 ≤ mHj ≤ 1; 0 ≤ dHj ≤ 1; 0 ≤ rHj ≤ 1; 0 ≤ eHj ≤ 1;
SBn ≥ 0; RBn > 0; fBn ≥ 0; FBn ≥ 0; ZBn > 0; CBn > 0;
0 ≤ mBn ≤ 1; 0 ≤ dBn ≤ 1; 0 ≤ rBn ≤ 1; 0 ≤ eBn ≤ 1.
42Initial consumer data: (k=1, ..., K(0))
¯ hk ≥ 0; ¯ bk ≥ 0; 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1; (Endowk(T) ≥ 0,T =0 ,1,...,TMax).
Period-T endogenous variables: (T = 0,1,...,TMax)





Other ﬁrm variables: (j=1, ...,J(T); n=1, ...,N(T))
FCostHj(T); TCostHj(T); ProﬁtHj(T); NetWorthHj(T);
J(T+1); MoneyHj(T + 1); CapHj(T + 1); DivHj(T +1 ) .
FCostBn(T); TCostBn(T); ProﬁtBn(T); NetWorthBn(T);
N(T+1); MoneyBn(T + 1); CapBn(T + 1); DivBn(T +1 ) .






Other consumer variables: (k=1, ...,K(T))
Inck(T); Savk(T); Expk(T); K(T +1 ) .
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The World Event Schedule, a system clock permitting World
inhabitants to time and order their activities (method activations),
including synchronized activities such as oﬀer posting and trade;
Protocols governing the ownership of stock shares;
Protocols governing collusion among ﬁrms;
Protocols governing the insolvency of ﬁrms;
Methods for retrieving stored World data;
Methods for receiving data.
Private Access:
// Private Methods
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data.
// Private Data
World attributes (e.g., spatial conﬁguration);
World inhabitants (e.g., markets, ﬁrms, consumers);
Attributes of the World’s inhabitants;
Methods of the World’s inhabitants;
History of World events;
Address book (communication links);
Recorded communications.






Protocols governing the public posting of supply oﬀers;
Protocols governing the price discovery process;
Protocols governing the trading process;
Methods for retrieving stored Market data;
Methods for receiving data.
Private Access:
// Private Methods
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data.
// Private Data
Information about ﬁrms (e.g., posted supply oﬀers);
Information about consumers (e.g., bids);
Address book (communication links);
Recorded communications.






getWorldProtocol(ownership of stock shares);
getWorldProtocol(collusion among ﬁrms);
getWorldProtocol(insolvency of ﬁrms);
getMarketProtocol(posting of supply oﬀers);
getMarketProtocol(trading process);
Methods for retrieving stored Firm data;
Methods for receiving data.
Private Access:
// Private Methods
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data;
Method for selecting my supply oﬀers;
Method for rationing my customers;
Method for recording my sales;
Method for calculating my proﬁts;
Method for allocating my proﬁts to my shareholders;
Method for calculating my net worth;
Methods for changing my methods.
// Private Data
My money holdings, capacity, total cost function, and net worth;
Information about the structure of the World;
Information about World events;
Address book (communication links);
Recorded communications.






getWorldProtocol(ownership of stock shares);
getMarketProtocol(price discovery process);
getMarketProtocol(trading process);
Methods for retrieving stored Consumer data;
Methods for receiving data.
Private Access:
// Private Methods
Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data;
Method for determining my budget constraint;
Method for determining my demands;
Method for seeking feasible and desirable supply oﬀers;
Method for recording my purchases;
Method for calculating my utility;
Methods for changing my methods.
// Private Data
My money holdings, subsistence needs, and utility function;
Information about the structure of the World;
Information about World events;
Address book (communication links);
Recorded communications.
}Table 5: World Dynamic Activity Flow
main () {
initWorld(); // Construct a world composed of agents
// (markets, ﬁrms, consumers,...) .
conﬁgWorld(); // Conﬁgure the world and its constituent
// agents with methods and data.
For (T = 0,...,TMax) { // Enter the World Event Schedule:
postOﬀers(); // Firms select supply oﬀers and
// publicly post them.
seekOﬀers(); // Consumers seek supply oﬀers in accordance
// with their needs and preferences.
match(); // Firms and consumers determine trade
// partners and record transaction costs.
trade(); // Firms and consumers engage in trade
// interactions and record trade outcomes.
update(); // Firms and consumers update their methods
// and data based on their search and trade
// experiences.
}
}